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Labor Fraud
Imagine a steel company struggling to stay afloat against strong national
and international competition. The company has an outdated production facility
in Youngstown, Ohio, and faces two related problems: the need for an infusion
of capital to upgrade the facility and the need to maintain employee morale
and productivity. A company official meets with people who are interested in
making an equity investment in the company. One potential investor asks
whether the company is currently profitable and whether the company plans
to stay in business for the long term. The official answers, "The company has
been profitable, and there are no plans for shutting down our operation." The
investors make a sizable equity contribution. Later that day, the official meets
with the employees of the Youngstown facility. Employees considering job
offers at a new plant down the street ask whether the facility is currently
profitable and whether the company plans to keep the plant operating for the
long term. The official answers, "The Youngstown facility has been profitable,
and there are no plans for shutting down our operation." The employees
decline the job offers elsewhere and continue working at the Youngstown
facility.
Now assume that the answers to both questions were lies. The official
knew that neither the company nor the plant was profitable and that plans were
in the works to shut down the plant and liquidate the company. The official
lied to the potential investors in order to gain a capital infusion to satisfy other
creditors holding short-term obligations. The official lied to the workers to
keep them working diligently while the company went though its death throes.
The company does eventually shut down, and the securities held by the
investors lose a significant portion of their value while the workers lose their
jobs.
Both the capital investors and the workers have suffered damage because
of the official's lies. Can they do anything about it? For the capital investors,
the answer is a resounding yes. Federal law offers significant protection against
fraud in the capital market. In this hypothetical, the capital investors would
likely have a claim against the official and the company under several
provisions of federal law, including section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act' and the Securities Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5.2 The
workers, however, are not the beneficiaries of any federal law protecting them
from such fraud in the labor market and would be left without a federal cause
of action against the company or the official. This Article argues that this
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
2. Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrvances. 17 C.FR. § 240.10b-5 (1997) For further
discussion of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, see infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the very limited remedies federal law provides. see infra notes 89-97 and
accompanying text. Moreover, federal law actually throws up obstacles to such protection that the
employees might otherwise receive under the common law. See infra Subsections IV B 1-2.
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difference in treatment, previously unanalyzed,4 is unjustified.
This hypothetical is derived from an actual case arising from the closing
of two United States Steel facilities in Youngstown in the late 1970s and early
1980s. 5 The corporation had operated two large steel mills in Youngstown
since the turn of the century. In the fall of 1977, the workers in these mills and
the Youngstown community generally were worried about rumors that the two
factories were to be closed. These rumors were not groundless. In later
litigation, U.S. Steel itself introduced exhibits of never-mailed letters dated
August 25, 1977, announcing the closing of both plants.6
Nonetheless, management answered the rumors by assuring employees that
shutdowns were not definite and stated on several occasions that the plants
could be saved if the workers improved productivity. "Hotline" telephones
were strategically placed in the two plants so that employees could listen to
prerecorded messages from management. The first such message told the
workers that there were "no immediate plans to permanently shut down" either
factory and that the mills' "continued operation" was "absolutely dependent
upon their being profit-makers. 7 Randall Walthius, an agent of U.S. Steel,
told the press that there were studies under way "aimed at making the
Youngstown facilities profitable" and that it would be "on the basis of the
plants' profitability that they will continue to operate."8
4. The analogy between fraud in the labor market and fraud in the securities market has been largely
invisible. No scholarship found during the course of writing this Article sought to compare a corporation's
duty of truthfulness to investors to its duty of truthfulness to its employees. Perhaps the analogy has been
largely unnoticed because of the power of categorization within the law. Labor law and corporate law are
rarely studied together, few lawyers and legal academics claim expertise in both areas. Corporate law is
seen as a basic, serious, and usually "conservative" subject in law school; it typically has little or nothing
to do with workers. On the other hand, labor and employment law are all about workers; they are probably
viewed as much more peripheral to the current law school curriculum and as trivial, "liberal," and
somewhat past their prime. This stark dichotomy obfuscates areas of analogous interests and shared
analysis. The duty to tell the truth explored in this Article is only one example of this actual overlap; there
are probably many more. For one article that explicitly draws comparisons between corporate law and labor
law but does not focus on issues of fraud, see Daniel R. Fisehel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared
with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984), which describes the similar
incentives that workers and investors face when entering into contracts with firms. For a perhaps hopeful
example of corporate and labor scholars coming together, see the papers presented at the Conference on
Employees and Corporate Governance, Columbia Law School/Sloan Project on Corporate Governance
(Nov. 22, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal). See also Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55
U. CHI. L. REv. 73 (1988).
This Article thus fits into the longstanding legal tradition of using analogies to explore legal problems.
See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary
on Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1993); cf Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest
in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) (drawing analogies between plant closings and certain aspects
of property law).
5. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980);
STAUGHTON LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL CLOSINGS (1982);
Singer, supra note 4, at 614-22.
6. See Local 1330, 631 F.2d at 1270 n.4.
7. Id. at 1270-71 (quoting William Ashton, Superintendent, U.S. Steel's Youngstown District) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 1271.
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The steelworkers responded to these representations as the company must
have hoped: They improved productivity and cut costs. In April 1978, plant
superintendent William Kirwan stated on the hotline that his plant had made
a profit during the previous month, thus showing that the goal of profitability
was "attainable." 9 Kirwan told the press later that month that the company
would "be doing business here for some time to come."'" In both May and
June 1978, Kirwan made similar profitability reports." By the end of 1978,
Kirwan was able to record a statement on the hotline recounting the year's
successes: "[E]arly in 1978 we initiated significant changes in our operations
in order to make Youngstown Works profitable and once again a viable
plant.... [W]e have attained our 1978 goal which was 'survival' and now we
embark on the 1979 goal which is 'revival." ' "2
The company also made representations to the general public that the
plants had righted themselves. For example, in a letter to the editor of the Wall
Street Journal published in April 1979, company management boasted that a
"complete turn-around has been achieved at Youngstown in the past year."'"
The letter asserted that a report that the Youngstown plants were eroding
corporate profits was "nonsense" and "'fiction."" These assurances continued
throughout 1979.' 5 Indeed, the Chairman of the Board of U.S. Steel, David
Roderick, emphasized in mid-June that, "[s]imply stated, we have no plans for
shutting down our Youngstown operation."' 6
The employees appeared to rely on the company's representations. They
improved their productivity, allowed management to adjust seniority policy to
save money, and waived grievances when management combined some
jobs. 17 Moreover, individual employees depended on the company's
representations to make important personal decisions. One employee, Frank
Georges, bought a new house on November 27, 1979, the day the Board of
Directors of U.S. Steel met in New York and voted to close both Youngstown
plants. The decision would put 3500 employees out of work. Georges heard
the news as he was driving home from the bank."
9. Id. at 1272.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1274-75.
12. Id. at 1272.
13. Id. (quoting a letter from Kirwan; C.I. Richards. Jr. an agent of U.S Steel- and R M Greer. also
an agent of U.S. Steel) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. at 1272-73 (quoting a letter from Ktrwan and R.M Greer) (internal quotation marks omitted)
15. In September 1979, Kirwan told a group of employees that the employees had "'sa~ed their jobs.-
Id. at 1276.
16. Id. at 1273. Only two things could cause a shutdown. Rodenck satd. *'massi e expenditures to
meet environmental requirements" or an "'unproductive plant operation - Id. But he reiterated that the
Youngstown plant was "profitable" and "'operating in the black.- Id. In early November. another corporate
representative, Frederick Foote, asserted that "[w]e've said all along the Ohio works has been profitable
and there are no plans for a shutdown." Id.
17. See id. at 1275-76.
18. See id. at 1277. Another employee admitted to his foreman that he was considenng other
employment because his pension had fully vested. The foreman advised him not to do so because he had
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The employees and their labor union sought legal recourse. Joined by the
Congressman from the affected district and the Attorney General of Ohio, the
union sued to enjoin the closure. The employees argued that statements made
by the company constituted an enforceable promise to keep the plants open as
long as the plants were profitable. 9 This claim was rejected by the courts,
which accepted the company's argument that, despite its earlier comments to
the contrary, the plants were not profitable. Even though there was some
evidence that U.S. Steel had changed its definition of profit over time,20
neither the federal district court nor the Sixth Circuit was willing "to exchange
its own view of the parameters of profitability for that of the corporation.'
The workers argued that, based on reliance interests, a "property right has
arisen from the long-established relation between the community ... and
Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and Defendant on the other. '22 After some initial
statements admitting sympathy for this claim, the district court decided that
there was no precedent for such a property right and that it lacked power to
create such a legal claim.23 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
holding.24
It is possible that David Roderick did not actually know of plans to close
the Youngstown plants when he made his statement only six months before the
announcement of the shutdown was made. Perhaps U.S. Steel used the same
definition of profit when company officials claimed the facilities were
profitable as when they closed them for lack of profitability. But it is also
possible that officials of U.S. Steel either told their workers incomplete truths
or complete untruths.
While it is common for chief executive officers to acknowledge that they
and their companies have obligations to be honest to their employees,25 there
a "secure future" with U.S. Steel. Id. at 1276. On the basis of this advice, the employee decided to stay
with the company, bought a new car, and purchased a new house. See id. at 1276-77.
19. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D. Ohio),
aff'd, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
20. See Local 1330, 631 F.2d at 1279 (reviewing plaintiffs' argument that the definition of profitability
the company used in setting goals for the employees was different from the one used in deciding to close
the plants).
21. Id. at 1278 (quoting Local 1330, 492 F. Supp. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id. at 1280 (quoting the amended complaint) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. See Local 1330, 492 F. Supp. at 9-10.
24. See Local 1330, 631 F.2d at 1281-82. For arguments that the district court and Sixth Circuit
wrongly decided this case, see Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:
Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 903, 938-42 (1985); Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 630 (1982); and Singer, supra note 4, at 614-
22, 632-63.
25. For example, Albert Dunlap, the former Chief Executive Officer of Scott Paper who cut 11,000
jobs in 1994, gained some public notoriety for his unabashed arguments that corporate layoffs were
necessary for the health of the U.S. economy. Corporate executives are not villains, he said, but rather they
are like doctors, healing sick companies and protecting the health of the economy. Even Dunlap recognized,
however, that "a CEO has an obligation to communicate with workers and prepare them for the inevitable."
Villains? Heck No. We're Like Doctors, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996, at 48.
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are abundant examples of companies that mislead their employees. These
companies may cause their employees to believe, for instance, that their jobs26
are more secure than they in fact are,- that their jobs will be better than they
26. While the problem of employer fraud is hardly limited to plant closings, such situations often
present particularly poignant examples of possible employer fraud. Not only is corporate downsizing
ubiquitous, but employers also have powerful incentives to keep the truth from their workers in such
situations. About 10 times a week, a large factory closes down somewhere in the United States. with each
closing throwing an average of 190 people out of work (these figures do not include mining, construction.
and service companies). See Jon Nordheimer, Downsized. But Not Out- A Mill Town's Tale. N Y. TI'.IEs.
Mar. 9. 1997, at C12. Between 1991 and 1995, nearly 2.5 million Americans lost their jobs because of
corporate restructuring. See Corporations Under Fire. N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 25. 1996. at D14 Only about a
third of those who lose their jobs find replacement work that pays at least as well as their former jobs See
Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfield, On the Battlefields of Business. Millions of Casualties. N Y TImis. Mar
3, 1996, at A26.
Beyond U.S. Steel's experience in Youngstown. there are numerous and more recent instances of
possible employer fraud. One will be described later in the .ext See infra Subsection IV B 3-a (discussing
White v. National Steel Corp., 938 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1991)). Another recent and particularly poignant
example of possible fraud comes from the Hathaway shir factor) in Waterville. Maine. %%here a mostly
female work force had been sewing Hathaway shirts for over 150 years See Adam Zagonn. Short-Shrted
in Maine, TIME, June 3, 1996, at 58. In early 1995. Linda Wachner. the Chief Executlse Officer of the
Wamaco Group, Inc., Hathaway's parent company, went to Waterville to quell fears of an imminent plant
closing. Sales were booming in Warnaco's various brands, and the stock price was soanng See id.. see also
Shareholder Scoreboard: Industr.-byIndustry lIVho Leads the Field in Shareholder Returny. WALL ST I.
Feb. 27, 1997, at R4 (table titled "Apparel-Clothing & Fabrics") (showing Wamaco stock's fise-year
average return to be the second best within its industry group). According to one account. Wachner assured
Waterville workers that she "would not close the plant" if the employees "would do quality work and bnng
the cost of the shirt down." Sara Rimer, Fall of a Slirtmaking Giant Shakes Its ftotnetoi.n. N.Y TIliS.
May 15, 1996, at A14. Afterward, the plant's employees forfeited a raise to help pay for productivity
consultants for the plant, and the employees' union persuaded the company to adopt a joint labor-
management program to address workplace problems and improve productivity. See Union Efforts To
Increase Productivity Not Enough To Keep Warnaco Plant Open. Daily Lab. Rep (BNA) No 98. at D-9
(May 21, 1996) [hereinafter Union Efforts].
By March 1996, the plant's employees had significantly increased the factory's productivity See
Rimer, supra (stating that productivity had doubled); see also Union Efforts. supra, at D-9 Istating that
output had increased by 33%). The productivity consultant claimed that the employees had "turned the plant
around." Rimer, supra. Wamaco, in the meantime, recorded unprecedented profits See Union Efforts.
supra, at D-9. On May 6, 1996, however. Wachner announced that Warnaco would quit making the
Hathaway line and either sell or scrap the Waterville plant. Hathaway shirts scre not keeping up with
Warnaco's other, more profitable product lines. See Rachel Spevack. "arnaco Pulling Plug on the Patch.
DAILY NEws REC. (New York), May 7, 1996. at I. The Watersille workers sscre shocked. The chief
steward of the local union said that the announcement of the closing was "totally, totally unexpected" Joe
Rankin & Darla L. Pickett, Hathaway Jobs in Jeopardy. CENT. ME. MORNING SE.N'TIs,. May 7. 1996. at
Al. According to the company, however, the plant closing "'shouldn't have been a surpnse" to the
Hathaway employees. Union Efforts, supra. at D-9 (quoting Michael Frettag. spokesperson for Wamaco)
Other examples of plant closings may have involved employer fraud. For example, in .Milne
Employees Ass'n %. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991), after the defendant corporation
bought Milne, an independent trucking company, Sun Camers's management allegedly made speeches and
showed videotapes promising the Milne employees job secunty and asked them to refrain from seeking
other employment. Several months later. Sun Carriers closed all of the Milne plants, See id. at 1405.
Similarly, in Washington v. Aircap Industries, 860 F. Supp. 307 (D S C 1994). the company decided in
May to close a factory but, even after this decision had been made. told the workers that the plant would
continue operating through the summer. The plant closed six weeks after this announcement with no
advance notice to the employees. See id. at 310-11. Even more recently. Bntish Petroleum (BP) closed a
profitable refinery in Lima, Ohio. after soliciting bids but refusing to sell it to potential buyers The Mayor
of Lima claimed that BP had not dealt "honestly" with the town and its employees Marc Cooper. A Town
Betrayed: Oil and Greed in Lima. Ohio, NATION, July II. 1997. at II. 13.
Entities other than employees and shareholders have also accused corporationrs of making
misrepresentations to them. For example, in Charter Township of Ypsilanti i General Motors Corp. 506
N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam). the city of Ypsilanti sued General Motors after it closed
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actually turn out to be,27 or that their health benefits are assured after
retirement when in fact they can be revoked at the will of the company.28 In
these cases, would the law have something to say about the companies'
actions? Should it?
Part I of this Article begins the analysis of these questions by sketching
the common law background of the tort of deceit and by comparing the
differences in the (high) level of protection against fraud in the capital market
and the (low) level of protection in the labor market. With a description of the
differences set out, Parts II through IV examine possible justifications for the
differences between the two levels of protection. Part II argues that economic
theory cannot explain the failure to offer fraud protection to workers. Truthful
information is important in all kinds of markets, including the labor market,
in order to allow people to allocate resources to those uses that offer the
greatest return. Part III explains why the market is unlikely to provide adequate
protection from fraud on its own. In Part IV, the Article claims that the
common law has not been, and will not likely be in the near future, an
adequate substitute for national, statutory protection against fraud in the
workplace. Common law remedies are insufficient because of meddlesome
procedural obstacles workers face in bringing common law fraud claims that
capital investors do not face in bringing claims under federal law. Moreover,
even when employee claimants succeed in overcoming these procedural
impediments, they appear to lose out disproportionately because courts apply
what amounts to a presumption against using common law tort to aid workers
defrauded by their employers.
In Part V, the Article explores the costs and benefits of national statutory
fraud protection for workers. The analysis shows that the net benefits of fraud
regulation are likely to be at least as high in the labor market as in the capital
markets. Ultimately, this Article concludes that there are no persuasive
justifications for having a federal statute that protects the capital market from
fraud but not having federal fraud protection in the labor market. The final
a plant located there. The city had granted the company numerous tax abatements on the basis of implicit
and explicit representations that the abatements would help enable the company to "continue production
and maintain continuous employment for our employees." Marleen A. O'Connor, Promoting Economic
Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction To Enforce Implicit
Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 219, 228 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
(quoting a General Motors spokesperson) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra note 272
(discussing the case).
27. See, e.g., Diane E. Lewis, Tenn. Workers Say Firm Owes Back Pay, BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 1997,
at AI (revealing that workers were lured to travel from Tennessee to Massachusetts with apparently false
promises of lucrative work).
28. See, e.g., Albert B. Crenshaw, Retiring? Don't Assume Health Benefits Are Forever, WASH. POST,
Nov. 3, 1996, at Al; Diane E. Lewis, More Retirees Find Full Health Coverage an Empty Promise,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1996, at D2; All Things Considered: 'Lifetime' Retiree Benefits Proving
Ephemeral (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 29, 1996) [hereinafterAll Things Considered] (comments
of Joanne Silberner), available in 1996 WL 12727040; see also infra notes 215-230 and accompanying text
(discussing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996)).
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section of Part V therefore sketches the contours of a possible federal statute
protecting the labor market from fraud.
I. A COMPARISON OF FEDERAL ANTIFRAUD PROTECTION IN THE
CAPITAL AND LABOR MARKETS
Federal law provides a high level of protection against fraud in the capital
market but offers a comparatively low level of such protection in the labor
market. This part describes these differences. Section I.A outlines the common
law tort of deceit, which provides the basis for the antifraud provisions of
federal securities law. Section I.B then describes the nature of, and the
rationale for, the fraud protection contained in federal securities law. Section
I.C illustrates the much more limited protection federal law offers to
employees who have been misled by actual or potential employers.
A. The Common Law Background
Most students preparing for the bar exam are able to set out the common
law elements of fraud: There must be a material misrepresentation of fact made
with some degree of scienter,29 and the hearer must have reasonably relied
on the misrepresentation and suffered damage as a result." The tort is an
ancient one-there was a writ of deceit as early as 1201." Although it has
been expanded significantly in both the United States and Great Britain over
the centuries, it has remained rooted to its core idea: It is wrong for a
participant in the marketplace to tell a lie in order to take value from another
in a market transaction.32
29. The level of scienter required is usually knowldge or recklessness but. at times and in Wine
jurisdictions, has been extended to include negligence. See Lot. is Loss. Ft \DAMIt-"IAts OF SEct RtES
REGULATION 713 (2d ed. 1988).
30. In the words of the Restatement:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact. opinion, intention or la%% for the
purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it. is subject to
liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by is justitfiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977); see also W PAGE KEETO% Er At.. PROSSER AD
KEETON ON THE LAWv OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984): Loss. supra note 29. at 712
31. See KEETON Er AL.. supra note 30, § 105, at 727
32. Much of this central idea was originally captured in the remedy of recision The defensise
employment of the law of recision entailed resisting a seller's action for breach of a contract shen the
seller had made a misrepresentation to induce the buyer's purchase Reciston uas alo asatlable as an
offensive tool by the buyer in an action for restitution. See id at 729-30. Lot IS Loss & JOEL SELIGMA5,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 971 (3d ed 1995)
In 1789. English courts severed the previously necessary connection betw~een misreprescntation and
the existence of a contract. See Pasley v. Freeman. 100 Eng Rep 450 (K B 1789) In Pasle . the tort was
held to lie where the plaintiff had no dealings with the defendant but had been induced b) his
misrepresentations to sell goods on credit to a third person. who subsequently defaulted A dissenting judge
argued that the precedents would not allow the action when there %N as no pns ity of contract betsccn the
parties, and the defense claimed that recognizing such a cause of action would bnng about "mischiefs and
19971
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One of the most important expansions of this idea concerned what
constitutes an untruth. Because courts now view the significance attached to
words or communicative conduct according to their effect, under the
circumstances, on the "ordinary" mind,33 a half-truth is as actionable as an
outright lie. 34 Statements that are reasonably capable of both a true and false
meaning will amount to misrepresentation if the plaintiff accepts the false
meaning and the defendant intends this result or knows that it will occur.
3 5
Statements that are literally true may also be actionable if they create a false
impression in the mind of the hearer. As one old state law case commented,
"A fraud may be as effectually perpetrated by telling the truth as a falsehood;
by calling things by their right names as by their wrong names."
36
Moreover, the common law now imposes liability in some circumstances
for partial or even complete silence. To be sure, courts did not traditionally
consider silence to be actionable deceit,37 but they have made important
exceptions. Silence does not protect someone who has a duty to speak because
of a fiduciary or other confidential relationship. 38 Also, complete silence does
inconveniences" for businesspeople. Id. at 455. But the court believed that the equities were sufficient to
allow the case to go forward, even without any precedent exactly on point. It would be "repugnant to law
[and] morality," in the words of one judge, to allow "a man [to] assert that which he knows to be false,
and thereby [to] do an everlasting injury to his neighbor, and yet not [to] be answerable for it." ld.; see also
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 376-78, 401-02 (3d ed. 1990); KEErON ET
AL., supra note 30, § 105, at 728; LOSS, supra note 29, at 714.
33. See, e.g., Downey v. Finucane, 98 N.E. 391, 394 (N.Y. 1912); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note
30, § 106, at 736.
34. See, e.g., Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410, 426 (1941) ("[A]
statement of a half truth is as much a misrepresentation as if the facts stated were untrue,"); The King v.
Kylsant (Lord), [1932] 1 K.B. 442 (Eng. Crim. App.) (holding that a prospectus that truthfully stated a
steamship line's average net income and dividends over a 10-year period was false because it did not reveal
the fact that earnings during the first three of those 10 years had been greatly augmented by World War
I); Loss, supra note 29, at 714-15.
35. As Lord Blackburn said in Smith v. Chadwick, [1883-84] 9 App. Cas. 187 (P.C. 1884) (appeal
taken from Eng.):
If they palter him in a double sense, it may be that they lie like truth; but I think they lie, and
it is a fraud. Indeed, as a question of casuistry, I am inclined to think the fraud is aggravated
by a shabby attempt to get the benefit of a fraud, without incurring the responsibility.
Id. at 201.
36. Mulligan v. Bailey, 28 Ga. 507, 510 (1859); see also KEETON Er AL., supra note 30, § 106, at
736-37.
37. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 106, at 737-38; LOss, supra note 29, at 715.
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977). A fiduciary has "an affirmative duty
of utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts, as well as an affirmative obligation
to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading his clients." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This exception has provided a basis for liability for silence in the context of fiduciary relations such
as principal and agent, see McDonough v. Williams, 92 S.W. 783, 788 (Ark. 1905); executor and
beneficiary of an estate, see Murphy v. Cartwright, 202 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1953); Foreman v. Henry,
210 P. 1026, 1030 (Okla. 1922); bank and investing depositor, see Brasher v. First Nat'l Bank, 168 So. 42,
46 (Ala. 1936); majority and minority stockholders, see Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D.
Del. 1951); and old friends, see Feist v. Roesler, 86 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, no writ).
The exception for silence that misrepresents has been undergoing something of an expansion recently
in that courts have recognized more and more instances in which an affirmative duty to speak is recognized.
For example, the former common law rule was that the seller of a house was under no affirmative duty to
disclose to a buyer an infestation of termites. See Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808, 808
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not protect a party to a business transaction who "by concealment or other
action intentionally prevents the other from acquiring material information.""
Any representation that creates a false impression, that covers up the truth, or
that removes an opportunity that might otherwise have led to the discovery of
a material fact is classed as misleading and is just as actionable as a verbal
assurance that the fact is not true. ° Examples include floating a ship to
conceal the defects in its bottom," sending one who is in search of
information in a direction where it cannot be obtained, 2 and even falsely
denying knowledge when in possession of the facts.
4 3
An additional exception to the general common law rule that silence is
immune from legal attack is the principle that if one does speak, she must
disclose enough to prevent her words from misleading. Half of the truth may
amount to a lie if the listener understands it to be the whole truth.4
Furthermore, one who makes a statement and subsequently acquires new
information that makes her previous statement misleading or untrue cannot
remain free from legal liability by staying quiet. She has an affirmative duty
to disclose such new information to anyone she knows still to be acting on the
basis of the original statement.4 5 This rule has been applied, for example, in
cases in which there is a significant decline in the profits of a business whose
sale is pending.46 The common law has historically provided numerous
protections for fraud in business relationships, protections that have undergone
significant expansion over the course of this century.
(Mass. 1942). Yet this rule has been under attack in recent years The Restatement nov. require,% disclosure
of
facts basic to the transaction, if [the defendant] knows that the other is about to enter into it
under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship betseen them, the
customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of
those facts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e). This provision is illustrated as follows -A sclls to B a
dwelling house, without disclosing to B the fact that the house is riddled with termtews This is a fact basic
to the transaction." Id. § 551 illus.3.
As one commentator has observed, "[Ulnder the modern law of misrepresentation, the existence of
a duty to disclose is not limited to situations involving preexisting fiduciary relationships " Alison Grey
Anderson, Fraud. Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading. 10 HOFSTRA L. REV 341, 351 (1982) Indeed. "there
has been a rather amorphous tendency on the part of most courts in recent years to find a duty of disclosure
when the circumstances are such that the failure to disclose something would violate a standard requirng
conformity to what the ordinary ethical person would have disclosed " KEETO1. ET AL. supra note 30. §
106, at 739.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550.
40. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 30. § 106. at 737.
41. See Schneider v. Heath, 170 Eng. Rep. 1462. 1463 (C.P. 1813)
42. See Chisolm v. Gadsden, 32 S.C.L. (I Strob ) 220 (1847)
43. See Smith v. Beatty, 37 N.C. (2 Ired.) 456 (1843) (per cunam). KETo'% ET AL. supru note 30.
§ 106, at 737.
44. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30. § 106, at 738.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) (1977)
46. See Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893).
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B. Federal Fraud Protection in the Capital Markets
1. The Basic Legal FramewOrk
Federal protection against fraud in the capital markets grew out of the
common law,47 and numerous federal statutory provisions give animation to
the core idea that market participants should not lie in a market transaction in
order to take value from others. If a company induced purchase of its securities
with fraudulent misrepresentations, it would be susceptible to suit under section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193448 and the Securities
Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5,49 the most famous and often used
antifraud provisions. 50 But these are not the only provisions that protect
against fraud in the capital markets by imposing on companies the obligation
to be accurate and complete in their communications to actual or potential
investors. For example, section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 states that
47. See Loss, supra note 29, at 712. The elements of a misrepresentation claim under the federal
securities laws are aligned with the elements of the common law tort claim. The analyses under the
common law and the federal statutes are sufficiently related that Loss has stated that "it seems reasonable
to assume at the very least that the most liberal common law views on these questions should govern under
these statutes." Id. at 716. While courts have said repeatedly that the fraud provisions of the Securities Acts,
as well as the mail fraud statute, are not limited to circumstances that would give rise to a common law
action for deceit, see, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943) (SEC Acts);
United States v. Groves, 122 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1941) (mail fraud), it is difficult to say precisely how
much further the federal provisions extend, see Loss, supra note 29, at 716.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.
49. Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). The Rule
reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
50. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (noting that section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5
"may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws"); FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE
AcT OF 1934 § 5.05[ I], at 5-46 & n.4 (Matthew Bender's Sec. Regulation Series, 1997) (noting that section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 have become "the most important of the causes of action under the federal securities
laws"); LoSs, supra note 29, at 728 (discussing the "revolution" in Rule lOb-5 litigation).
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any person who .. offers or sells a security .. by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements... not misleading... shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him."
Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act also animates the core common law idea. It
creates a cause of action for those who purchase a company's security after the
company has issued a registration statement that "contain[s] an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact ... necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading."' 2 Moreover, the company
would also potentially face suit under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, which
makes it unlawful for a seller of securities "to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or ... to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact."53
A company's duty to be truthful to actual or potential investors stretches
beyond the official registration statements a company is required to tile with
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)." A company and its insiders can
51. 15 U.S.C. § 771; see also LOSS & SELIGMA\. supra note 32. at 982-83 "le penalties lot a
violation of section 12 can be quite severe. See FRA'NK H EASTERBROOK & DAii.t. R FISCIILL. THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 335-36 (199 1)
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Section II makes issuers stnctl% liable for matenal misstateinents. and the
purchaser can recover her trading loss without proing reliance See Paul G Mahone>. Precaution Cost%
and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets. 78 VA. L REv 623. 632-33 (1992). see also Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 1003. The causes of action under both section 12(2) and section I Ilat % art-
somewhat from what the common law would have required See Loss & SEUGIA%. supra note 32. at 984.
87, 1008-13.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(l)-(2). Other pertinent provisions include section 9(a)(4) of the 193-4 Act.
which makes it unlawful
for any dealer or broker... to make. regarding an), secunty registered on a national secunties
exchange, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such sceunt), anN statement
which was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under sshich it %%as made. false or
misleading with respect to any material fact. and which he knea or had reasonable ground to
believe was so false or misleading.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4). See generally Loss, supra note 29. at 699-711 (identif)ing federal sisiutor)
protection including section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 15 U S C § 77qta). section 15(ci of the 19 34 Act. 15
U.S.C. § 78o(c), and the mail and wire fraud statutes. see 18 U SC §§ 1341. 1343 (19)4) Before the
Securities Act of 1933, the federal government could deal aith secuntes fraud onl, through cniminal
prosecution for violations of the mail fraud statute, see 18 U S C. § 1341. or for conspirac) to %tolatc it.
see 18 U.S.C. § 371, or through the Postmaster General's administratise ability to enter a so-called "'fraud
order" under which all mail directed to the respondent or his agent aould be returned to the sender. see
39 U.S.C. § 3005(a) (1994). See Loss. supra note 29. at 699
54. The federal securities laws require companies to file certain current. quarterls, and annual reports
with the SEC. See J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.. THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DlSCLOSt RE at %it (2d ed
Supp. 1 1997). For example, filings are required under the 1933 Act in "'registration statements for public
offerings or distributions or in circulars to be furnished in the case of *exempt' offenngs under Regulation
D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-506 (1980), or Rule 144. 17 C FR. § 230 144 (1988)"" Victor Brudnes. A Note
on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securties Lams. 75 VA L RE% 723. 726-27 n 11
(1989). Also, the 1934 Act mandates filings under "the registration and continuous disclosure requirements
of §§ 12 and 13(a) and the rules thereunder; the proxy rules promulgated under § 14(a). the 'going-pnsate*
rules promulgated under § 13(e); the tender offer and takeover rules promulgated under §§ 13(d. 13ie).
and 14(d); and the insider trading rules under § 16." Id.
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violate federal law by disseminating false or misleadingly incomplete
information in some informal context such as a report, press release, or
director's speech, even if the communication is voluntary.55 Federal antifraud
law enforces, in this context, what is essentially a requirement of
completeness.56  Factual accuracy will not insulate a company's
communication from possible liability if the statement is nevertheless
materially misleading." Said another way, "[A] duty to speak the full truth
arises when a defendant undertakes to say anything. 58 Again, this duty of
completeness attaches even when the communication is completely
discretionary.5 9
Moreover, accuracy and completeness at the moment of the disclosure do
not necessarily prevent liability. Companies may have an obligation to ensure
The focus of this Article is whether the duty to refrain from fraud should be applied to the labor
markets through a federal law. Whether the additional duty to make certain affirmative disclosures should
apply to the labor market is not considered here. Some, however, have attacked mandatory disclosure
requirements. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 444-45 (4th ed. 1992) (stating
that prospectuses are "[w]ritten in a forbidding legal and accounting jargon" that are "of no direct value
to the unsophisticated stock purchaser" and that it is "widely accepted by economists" that "regulation of
new issues does not help investors"). But see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection ofInvestors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984) (concluding that the economic case
against mandatory disclosure is equivocal). This debate, however, is beyond the scope of the more basic
protection that this Article proposes.
55. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), for example, the company
voluntarily distributed a misleading press release about a huge ore strike. The Second Circuit concluded
that "[iut does not appear to be unfair to impose upon corporate management a duty to ascertain the truth
of any statements the corporation releases to its shareholders or to the investing public at large." Id. at 861 -
62. Rule lOb-5, said the court,
is violated whenever assertions are made ... in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public, e.g., by means of the financial media ... if such assertions are false or
misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the release
was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.
Id. at 862.
56. See BROWN, supra note 54, § 3.02, at 3-6. It is worth noting here that there are differences
between the obligations established under the antifraud scheme (duties not to mislead) and those obligations
established under contract doctrine (duties to fulfill promises). Although the obligations in these two areas
are sometimes similar, they do differ. See infra Section IV.A (discussing contract doctrine).
57. See McMahan & Co. v. Warehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[A]
statement which is literally true, if susceptible to quite another interpretation by the reasonable investor...
may properly ... be considered a material misrepresentation ...." (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
58. First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Heil v. Lebow, No.
91 Civ. 8656 (JFK), 1994 WL 637686, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1995) ("[L]iterally true disclosures can
be rendered misleading through omission.").
59. See BROWN, supra note 54, § 3.03[1], at 3-8 n.26 (citing cases). Actionable communication can
include an overstatement of revenue, a misleading press release about a new product, misstatements about
the product's stage of development, references about a production date that turn out to be false, untrue
suggestions that a new product will be shipped soon or will be shipped in substantial quantities, overly
optimistic statements about the impact of a product on the market, statements incompletely characterizing
the results of new product testing, and the failure to disclose known difficulties with a product. See id.
§ 1.01[1], at 1-3; id. § 5.03[2][d], at 5-17 to -29; id. § 5.03[3][b-c], at 5-31 to -41; see also In re Apple
Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying the defendant summary judgment where it
had made overly optimistic statements about a new product).
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continued accuracy after disclosure under a duty to correct and update. 60
When an earlier statement has become misleading in a material respect, an
affirmative duty to disclose may arise.61 While this duty might not exist when
confusion in the market stems from inaccurate rumors or information
circulating among the investing public, a response from the company may
become necessary if "the issuer is the source of the inaccuracies or is
responsible for their dissemination. 62 In any event, the federal requirement
to avoid false or materially incomplete statements sometimes creates, in effect,
an affirmative duty to disclose when a company's earlier statement has become
materially misleading.
Federal securities laws have made actionable a range of fraudulent
activities that lie outside the paradigmatic case. As at common law, no
requirement of contractual privity exists in the affirmative misrepresentation
case. An affirmative misrepresentation or material omission may be actionable
even though neither the company nor a company insider actually engages in
any trades; a company that knowingly or recklessly disseminates false
information will be liable to those who buy or sell securities on the basis of
the false information. 63 This expansion from the core case protects traders in
the secondary markets from fraud, even though the securities they purchase or
sell were issued by the company much earlier and even if the other parties to
the transactions are private individuals.
A second expansion from the paradigmatic case is the explosion of liability
for insider trading, which occurs when a corporation or its insiders trade in the
corporation's securities without disclosing material information unavailable to
the public. In this context, liability does not depend on an affirmative
misstatement. Instead, federal law imposes an affirmative duty on the
corporation or insider to disclose material information or to abstain from
trading. 64 This affirmative duty of disclosure arises from the presence of a
60. See BROWN, supra note 54, § 3.02. at 3-6: Brudne.. supra note 54. at 749 n 72 (citing cases and
scholarship).
61. The SEC
believes that, depending on the circumstances, there is a duty to correct statements made i an ,
filing .. if the statements either have become inaccurate by virtue of subsequent eents. or are
later discovered to have been false and misleading from the outset, and the issuer know's or
should know that persons are continuing to rely on all or any matenal portion of the statements
LOSS, supra note 29, at 737 (quoting Secunties Act Release No. 6084. 17 SEC Dock 1048. 1054 (July 10.
1979)); see also Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers. Inc. 425 F2d 842. 843 t2d Cir
1970) (finding liability for failure to correct a press release). SEC v Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. 297 F
Supp. 470, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same); LOss. supra note 29. at 737 n.57 (citing cases)
62. Loss, supra note 29, at 738 (citing John M. Sheffey. Securites Law Responsibdities of Issuers
To Respond to Rumors and Other Pubhcity. 57 NOTRE DAME L-A\ 755 (1982)). see also Loss. supra note
29, at 738 n.58 (citing cases).
63. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249-50 (1988). LoSs. supra note 29. at 736
64. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833. 861-62 (2d Cir 1968). Brudney. supra
note 54, at 737 n.44. In addition, under the *'misappropnation" doctine of l0b-5. w.hich the Supreme Court
recently validated, the duty to disclose or abstain attaches to others who have access to information
unavailable to the market generally and who would violate a fiduciary duty "'or other similar relationshtp
of trust and confidence" by using the information, without disclosure to the principal. to gain an advantage
The Yale Law Journal
fiduciary duty between the insider or corporation and the other transacting
party.65 Thus, if a corporation wants to trade in its own securities (say,
through the distribution of securities to the public or through corporate
repurchase of its own stock in freezeouts or self-tenders), it has a duty to
disclose any information that would be material to the party buying or selling
the stock.66
In short, the securities acts have protected investors from fraud since their
inception. In the years since 1933, courts and the SEC have greatly expanded
the scope of this protection beyond the paradigmatic fraud case. Under the
current regime investors are provided with a high level of protection covering
a wide range of additional situations.
2. The Rationales for, and Continuing Importance of, Federal Protection
The requirements that corporate communications be truthful and complete
are premised on the belief that an increase in the quantity, and an improvement
in the quality, of information available to investors will facilitate intelligent
investment decisions and improve the efficiency of securities markets in
pricing securities and in allocating financial capital to real capital.67 The
in a market transaction. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2216 (1997).
65. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980);
Anderson, supra note 38, at 344; Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REv. 322, 353-67 (1979); Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 314-39.
For a defense of fiduciary duty in corporate law, see Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not
Contracts: A Defense of Fidelitatis Connexio Against the Assault by Utilitarianism and Economic Analysis,
81 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 1998).
The fraud arises from the interaction between the nondisclosure and the existence of a fiduciary duty.
See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33; see also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 575-76 (2d Cir.
1991) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the development of insider trading
case law by the Supreme Court). In the misappropriation context, the fraud is seen as arising from the
failure of the misappropriator to disclose to the principal that she intends to trade on the basis of the
information. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211.
66. See Brudney, supra note 54, at 736.
67. See id. at 735-36; see also H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at II (1934) (stating that with accurate
information the competing judgments of buyers and sellers will lead to a price that reflects as nearly as
possible a hypothetical just price), reprinted in I SECURITIES L. COMM., FEDERAL BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 793, 804 (1983) [hereinafter SECURITIES LAWS:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation:
A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 314 (1974) (noting that disclosure promotes accurate investment
analysis and protects unsophisticated investors from unfair treatment); Brudney, supra note 65, at 334
(suggesting that the goal of disclosure is to make price reflect value). This is also the rationale for the
affirmative duties of registration and disclosure. See supra note 54; see also Brudney, supra note 54, at
741.
In the insider trading cases, reference is often made to the importance of maintaining '"fair and honest
markets."' E.g., O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1994)). The market rationale cannot be the principal basis for the insider trading rules, however,
because the requirement that the trader violate a fiduciary duty means that only a subset of traders with
greater-than-market information will be prohibited from trading. Indeed, as the Supreme Court said in Dirks
and reiterated in O'Hagan, "There is no 'general duty between all participants in market transactions to
forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information."' Id. at 2212 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655).
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mechanism through which this occurs is relatively straightforward. When fraud
is not penalized, the price of a company's security is not likely to reflect
accurately the underlying ability of the firm to create wealth. Financial capital
then moves from higher-valuing to lower-valuing users." But if fraud is
illegal and accurate information about firms is otherwise available to people
looking to invest, the market prices of the securities of those firms will better
reflect the relevant characteristics of those firms. If the securities are priced
below (or above) what informed investors are willing to pay, the informed
investor will purchase (or sell) the securities until the price rises (or falls) to
the price the informed investor is willing to pay. Thus, when
information-untainted by fraud-is available, the market price will
automatically adjust as a result of the activity of the informed investors.
Importantly, only some investors need to be informed for prices to adjust.
In an efficient market, uninformed investors can obtain the information they
need from the price itself.69 Thus antifraud laws protect even those investors
who do not directly hear the fraudulent or misleading statement because
antifraud laws help ensure that market prices accurately reflect the relevant
characteristics of particular firms. When security prices are accurate, even an
uninformed investor cannot make what is ex ante a bad deal. "By accepting the
market price, investors are protected."'0
Indeed, in O'Hagan, the Court made clear that if the misappropnator of information disclosed to her
principal (as opposed to the other party in the secunties transaction) that she intended to trade on the
information, there would be no liability under section 10(b). esen though the market uould be as decei'ed
as if there had been no disclosure to the pnnctpal. See d at 2211 n 9. tl at 2225 (Thomas. J . concurrng
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The principal rationale for the insider trading rules is the notion that it is "'desirable to denN persons
having exclusive possession of certain kinds of information an adsantage ocr others s,,th %%hom they
effectively transact, but who cannot lawfully get such information "" Brudne). supra note 54, at 735. see
also Brudney, supra note 65, at 334. This rationale is related to another justification that animated Congress
in adopting the acts, that the public interest would be served by recognizing and equalizing "the gross
inequality of bargaining power between the professional secunties firm and the aerage inestor " Loss.
supra note 29, at 716. As the Second Circuit explained in an early case under the securities acts. "'The
essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those u ho do not kno% market conditions from the
overreachings of those who do." Charles Hughes & Co. %. SEC. 139 F2d 434. 437 (2d Ctr 1943) Another
court has stated that the securities laws were enacted "for the %cry purpose of protecting those %,ho lack
business acumen." United States v. Monjar, 47 F Supp 421. 425 (D Del 1942). aff'd. 147 F2d 916 t3d
Cir. 1944); see also Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC. 177 F.2d 228. 233 (D C Ctr 1949) tstattng that "the
investing and usually naive public needs special protection in this held"). Loss. supra note 29, at 719
(noting that the purpose of securities laws was to protect unsophtsttcated mitors) But een these
explanations overstate the rationale for the tnstder trading rules because inequalty in kno ledge ts not
enough; there must be a breach of fiduciary duty as ssell
68. See Mahoney, supra note 52, at 631.
69. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Societ. 35 AM ECO%. REv 519. 526-27 1945) For
a general review of the efficient capital market hypothesis. see RONALD J Gtt.,SO' & BERARD S BLACK.
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQU*ISITIONS 135-81 (2d ed. 1995). for an analysts of the
informational content of prices in other markets. see Mahoney. supra note 52. at 641-44
70. Fischel, supra note 4, at 1066. Uninformed investors may. of course, lose somesshat if they
purchase or sell securities during the period of time that the market price is adjusting to the acts% ity of the
informed investor (indeed, they may be selling to the informed ,nsestor). But prices in the capital market
typically adjust very quickly, so the uninformed investor will be protected in the great majority of cases
See Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Acti'el' Traded
The Yale Law Journal
These rationales are strongest with regard to fraud in the initial distribution
of securities. As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have pointed out,
"There is no good reason for ... telling lies in the issuance of stock."'
Fraud in these situations causes the greatest misallocation of resources. When
resources are diverted into businesses that are less efficient than competing
businesses, there is genuine loss. 72 The penalties available for this type of
"core" fraud are thus typically greater than when the fraud is committed in the
secondary market.73
The strength and importance of the rationales underlying these protections
are emphasized by their federal scope and mandatory nature in an area
otherwise dominated by state law and generally subject to contractual
defeasance. Generally, firms are free under modern corporate statutes to
structure themselves however they choose.74 Most state statutes establish
standard forms for corporations, but these terms can be altered through
amendment of a corporation's charter or bylaws. The antifraud rules embodied
in the federal securities laws, however, are national in scope and impose
mandatory obligations that cannot be varied by agreement. Shareholders cannot
opt out of the disclosure and antifraud protection of the securities laws.75 This
reflects Congress's implicit determination that, even if individual shareholders
and directors would choose to opt out of the federal securities laws, the
harmful effects on the market of such opting-out would be sufficiently severe
to justify the public's interest in enforcing the law's protection and
obligations.76
It bears notice as well that the federal securities laws have largely avoided
the fate of many other New Deal programs that have been overruled,
rescinded, or repudiated. They continue to enjoy both implicit and explicit
public support. 77 To be sure, some federal antifraud provisions have been
subject to criticism, primarily for providing a basis for strike suits any time a
Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 12-13 (1982). The corollary to this point is that investors with new information
will make better-than-market returns only until the price adjusts. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 69, at
135.
71. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 336.
72. See id.; see also Mahoney, supra note 52, at 633 (arguing that "the wealth transfer to the defendant
is a good proxy for the net social cost of primary-market frauds").
73. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 335-36.
74. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 1063.
75. Companies can contract around the registration requirements of the securities laws in certain
limited circumstances if the securities to be sold are offered only to a small number of sophisticated
investors. See, e.g., Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1996). The antifraud rules, however, cannot be
contracted around even in these circumstances. See id. preliminary note I ("This section relates solely to
the application of section 5 of the [1933] Act and not to antifraud or other provisions of the federal
securities laws.").
76. The mandatory nature of the antifraud rules also reflects Congress's determination that investors
should not have to rely on common law remedies in tort or contract. See infra Part IV.
77. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 669; see also infra note 85 and accompanying
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company's stock price falls.78 These criticisms provided the impetus for the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,' 9 which made changes vis-
ii-vis certain duties of managers to be truthful to shareholders. One of the most
important pertained to the creation of two "safe harbors" for forward-looking
statements.80  One safe harbor protects a person making a putatively
misleading statement about the future if it is accompanied by "meaningful"
cautionary statements identifying "important factors" that could cause actual
results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement."2 The
second requires the plaintiff to prove the speaker made the forward-looking
statement with actual knowledge (rather than recklessness) that the statement
was false or misleading. 2
Even with these changes, however, capital investors continue to have
significant federal protection against fraud. First of all, the safe harbors do not
preclude the SEC, as opposed to individual plaintiffs, from bringing actions
against a corporate official who makes a putatively misleading statement about
the future. Second, the safe harbors are attempts to limit litigation costs arising
from strike suits. They can hardly be seen as a retreat from the key principle
that fraud in the capital market is inefficient and unfair. Misleading statements
about the future will still provide the basis for a private cause of action if they
are made knowingly and are not accompanied by sufficient cautionary
language to give the listener pause.
Indeed, much of the criticism of the present state of federal fraud law-as
well as the recent changes animated by these criticisms-goes to the
expansions of federal protection and does not reach the heart of the federal
protection against fraud.83 There seems to be a remarkable consensus that, on
78. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 421 U S 723. 741 (1975) (recognizing the
social costs of strike suits); Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement Speed Bump
or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 675, 678-79 (1996): see also Mahoney. supra note 52, at 624-2.5
(criticizing the expansion of federal fraud protection that came about through the adoption of the "'fraud-on-
the-market" theory of reliance); Roberta Romano. Directors' and Officers' lDabilit Insurance- What Went
Wrong?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILTY LA\v 67. 69 (Walter Olson ed.. 1988) (describing the increase
in the number of claims filed against directors).
79. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z); see also John W Avery.
Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw. 335 (1996) (analyzing the statute and its legislative history).
80. The SEC had previously provided other safe harbors. For 45 years. the SEC discouraged firms
from making any projections of profits or other forward-looking disclosures on the ground that this kind
of information was inherently misleading. In 1979, however, the SEC issued Rule 175. 17 CFR. § 230.175
(1996), permitting the disclosure of projections and forecasts provided they are adequately supported. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 696; James R. Repeti. Management Buyouts. Effictent Markets.
Fair Value, and Soft Information. 67 N.C. L. REv. 121. 140-41 (1988).
81. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27A(c)(1)(A)(ti). 109 Stat. at 750; see also
Avery, supra note 79, at 355.
82. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27A(c)(l)(B). 109 Stat. at 750-51 No
cautionary language is necessary under this safe harbor. See Avery, supra note 79. at 355
83. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 52, at 625. 630-31. Though Mahoney cnticizes the Supreme Court
for loosening the reliance element that was previously essential under the common law. he does not retreat
from the notion that legal protection from fraud is necessary.
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the whole, the benefits of rules against fraud outweigh their costs." No
serious movement exists either in politics or in academe calling for the end of
government protection against securities fraud.85 Even in the recent statutory
changes, the "core" of federal fraud law was untouched: If a company or a
corporate official knowingly or recklessly makes a material misrepresentation
about existing facts in order to take value from another in a securities
transaction and the other party to the transaction relies on the misrepresentation
to her detriment, the company or official will be liable. This tenet remains
unquestioned.86
C. Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market
Like investors, workers contribute an essential input to companies' creation
of wealth through the production of goods and services. Also like investors,
workers have a difficult time acquiring and evaluating the information
necessary for them to decide whether and how they should make their
contribution.87 Like investors who have to evaluate factors including the
complexity of financial documents, market risk, and expected returns, workers
have to analyze the financial strength of employers, market risk, working
84. Without a detailed empirical analysis, it is difficult to prove absolutely that the costs of a rule
against fraud outweigh the benefits. Lynn Stout has pointed out, however, that if the absence of federal
fraud protection caused the value of the securities market to be discounted only one percent, that would
be equivalent to a $100 billion dollar decline in the value of outstanding corporate securities. See Lynn A.
Stout, Type I Error Type II Error and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 711,
714-15 (1996). As Stout suggests, it is difficult to imagine the costs of strike suits outweighing the benefit
of avoiding such a decline. See id.
85. See id. at 713 (stating that there is a "consensus" among securities scholars that fraud is "very,
very bad"). In a forthcoming article, Roberta Romano calls for the end of mandatory federal regulation of
securities in favor of "a market-oriented approach of competitive federalism" that would allow states to
compete with each other on the basis of their systems of securities regulation. Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June
1998) (manuscript at 2, on file with the Yale Law Journal). She bases her argument on what she calls the
"successful experience of the U.S. states in corporate law, in which the 50 states and the District of
Columbia compete for the business of corporate charters." Id. While Romano questions the efficiency of
mandatory fraud protection at the federal level, she does not argue that fraud law itself is inefficient or
improper. Whether the proper situs for fraud protection in the capital market is at the state or federal level
is beyond the scope of her article. Nevertheless, Romano appears to be expressing a minority view, and
there are a number of grounds on which to question her argument. As Joel Seligman has pointed out, the
federalization of antifraud protection took place because of a "widely held belief" that a web of state laws
could not provide adequate checks on fraud in the capital market. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for
a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (1983). With the growing sophistication
and size of the capital markets, it is worth questioning how one could expect states to be more successful
at fraud regulation in the 1990s than in the 1930s. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National
Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1882-83
(1997) (arguing that, in most countries, including the United States, it is more efficient for there to be a
single national securities regime than a multitude of state regimes). In the context of fraud protection for
workers, this Article discusses below whether a federal antifraud scheme for workers would be more
efficient than state protection. See infra notes 182-184, 303-312 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 51, at 336 ("There is no good reason for not
registering stock required to be registered or for telling lies in the issuance of stock.").
87. See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
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conditions, benefits, wages, termination policies, promotion practices, grievance
procedures, and hours. Moreover, the decisions workers make in choosing
employers tend to have long-term implications, probably to a greater extent
than for investors choosing among investment vehicles." Unlike investors,
however, workers are not protected by a federal statute comparable to those
protecting capital investors. No generally applicable federal protection exists,
even for statements that would seemingly be at the core of antifraud protection.
To be sure, workers enjoy a range of federal protection in the workplace,
and some federal statutes require employers to disclose information. For
example, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act"
generally obliges employers of one hundred or more employees to give
employees or their union sixty days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff."o
An employer who violates the notice provisions is liable for penalties equal to
back pay for each day of the violation, up to sixty days. 9' In addition, certain
statutes require employers to disclose information about workplace risks to
which employees are exposed,92 and federal labor law requires that companies
negotiating with unions hand over certain relevant information.9" Moreover,
to the extent that much of the need for protection from employer fraud arises
in the context of possible plant closings, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 94 provides some protection by allowing unions to bring charges
against an employer before the National Labor Relations Board for unfair labor
practices. Unfair labor practices may include the refusal to bargain about the
88. See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
90. See id. § 2102.
91. See id. § 2104(a)(1); see also North Star Steel Co v. Thomas. 515 US 29. 31-33 (1995)
(providing an overview of WARN Act): cf. Washington v Aircap Indus.. 860 F Supp 307 (D S C 1994)
(holding that employees were entitled to back pay only for "'ork days" %ithm the violation period)
92. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). 29 U S C §§ 651-678 OSHA
regulations provide that "employees have both a need and a right to know the hazards and identities of the
chemicals they are exposed to when working." 29 C.F.R. § 1910 1200 app. E (1996) Pursuant to OSHA.
employers must provide all employees with access to Material Safety Data Sheets that contain vital
information about the health hazards associated with chemicals present in the workplace. See td OSHA
also established the Records Access Rule. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020. which requires employers to provide
their employees with access to records voluntarily created by the employer that contain the medical and
exposure histories of other employees who have been previously exposed to toxic substances or other
physically harmful agents.
93. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.. 351 U.S. 149. 153 (1956) (ruling that it is an unfair labor practice
for a company to claim financial inability to pay a wage increase and then to refuse to allo, the union to
see the company's books to verify the claim); Oil, Chem. & Atomic workers Local 6-418 % NLRB. 711
F.2d 348, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the employer's duty to bargain in good faith with a labor
union includes a duty to supply the union with "'requested information that will enable [the unionl to
negotiate effectively and to perform properly its other duties as bargaining representative"' (quoting Local
13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Communications Union v. NLRB. 598 F2d 267. 271 (D C. Cir
1979))). This duty to provide relevant information typically includes matters central to the bargaining
process, such as wages and work hours, and can extend to details of chemical exposure and other work
hazards. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local. 711 F.2d at 359. 361.
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
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effects of a plant closing. 95 To the extent that the need for fraud protection
arises in the context of employee benefits, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)96 may provide some limited protection. 97
None of these statutes, however, provides a general remedy to protect
workers from employer fraud. Indeed, not only are employees afforded fewer
statutory protections than shareholders, but federal law also makes it more
likely that employers will not be held liable for any untrue statements to their
employees. It does so by making it more difficult for employees to take
advantage of fraud remedies they might have otherwise received under the
common law. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 98
grants federal jurisdiction over suits for violations of collective bargaining
agreements.99 Under section 301, courts must determine whether the
collective bargaining agreement preempts claims an employee has brought
under other statutes or the common law.' Because this preemption doctrine
is interpreted quite broadly, it often stands as a significant obstacle to
unionized employees seeking to sue their employers over putative
misstatements pertaining to plant closings or job security. ERISA similarly
includes a broad preemption doctrine. If the employee fraud suit pertains to
alleged misstatements about employee benefits, a number of courts have held
that federal law preempts such claims.'0 ' In addition, the remedies that
ERISA provides are less protective of workers than those offered by the
common law.1 2 Thus, not only do workers have less federal statutory
95. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 n.15 (1981); Thomas C. Kohler,
Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light ofFirst National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 402, 415 (1983); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CII. L.
REv. 575, 589 n.52 (1992).
There are significant loopholes in the NLRA's protective scheme. Most crucially, companies are not
required to bargain over whether a plant should be closed in the first place. See First Nat'l Maintenance,
452 U.S. at 686; United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422.
1430 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Stone, supra, at 588. Moreover, according to Stone, effects bargaining generally
takes place after the employer has made and implemented a decision, when the union no longer has
leverage to protect its members. If the employer violates its obligation to engage in effects bargaining, the
remedy for the violation is limited to back pay and is typically calculated from five days after the date of
the court or board order until the time the parties reach either agreement or impasse. This time period is
not to exceed the time the employee actually was out of work but cannot be less than two weeks. See In
re Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389, 390 (1968). In effect, "this means that when a
violation is found, the employer quickly bargains to impasse and is liable for back pay for only two
weeks." Stone, supra, at 589 n.52 (citing as an example Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1144-46 (7th Cir.
1983)).
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
97. See infra notes 215-230 and accompanying text (discussing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065
(1996)).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 185.
99. See Stone, supra note 95, at 593-96.
100. See id. at 577.
101. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
102. These preemption doctrines are considered in more detail below. See infra Subsections IV.B. 1-2.
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protection from fraud than capital investors, they also face obstacles in
pursuing common law fraud claims that equity investors do not.
This difference between the high level of federal protection against fraud
in the capital markets and the low level of federal protection in the labor
markets might be justified on a number of public-regarding grounds. Perhaps
truthful information is not important in the labor market, or not as important
in the labor market as in the capital market. Or even if truthful information is
important, perhaps private mechanisms would insure it. Perhaps the labor
market will self-correct without government regulation; or perhaps the common
law already provides adequate protection. Perhaps states can act on their own
initiative to provide a solution. Perhaps, finally, the costs of regulation would
be higher or the benefits of regulation lower in the labor market than in the
capital market. The remainder of this Article will examine whether any of
these possible justifications are persuasive in explaining the existing situation.103
103. As a descriptive matter, the difference between the level of fraud protection may be explained
not by public-regarding reasons but by the interplay of pressure groups on the legislatie and regulatory
process. See, e.g., MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USFS OF POLMCS 56 (1964) (**Admintstrattve
agencies are to be understood as economic and political instruments of the parties they regulate and benelit.
not of a reified 'society,' 'general will,' or *public interest.'"); Sam Peltzman. Toward a More General
Theoty of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976) (arguing that government officials are vote maximizers
who arbitrate among competing interests that seek to use the government to redistrbute resources); Richard
A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MG, T. Sci. 22 (1971) (arguing that one function
of regulation is the performance of distributive and allocative chores usually associated with the taxing
branch of the government); George J. Stigler. The Theory of Economic Regulation. 2 BELL J ECON. &
MGMT. Sct. 3, 3 (1971) ("[R]egulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated pnmanly
for its benefit."). Because they are a result of pressure group politics, the argument would go. regulations
serve the broader public interest only by accident. See Easterbrook & Fischel. supra note 54. at 671 In this
view, the difference between the high level of protection against fraud available to capital investors and
the low level of protection available to workers is explained simply by the greater ability of capital
investors to affect the political process.
There may be much to this story that is correct. But even if this explanation is factually accurate, it
serves only as a positive explanation rather than a normative justification for the difference betwcen the
two levels of legal protection. Justifications ought to matter. See. e.g., ARISTOTLE. POLMcS 69 (Benjamin
Jowett trans., The Viking Press 2d prtg. 1959). As Anstotle wrote-
The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one. or the few. or the many.
govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the
private interest, whether of the one, or of the few. or of the many. are perversions
Id. To the extent that justifications do matter (to public servants, legislators, judges. lawyers, or academics.
among others), the pressure group description is incomplete and dissatisfying. Indeed. some scholars have
argued that, even as a descriptive matter, regulatory politics are not completely about power and that
justifications are important in the formulation of legislative and regulatory initiatives. See. e.g.. James Q
Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLmCS OF REGULATION 357. 370-72. 393 (James Q wilson
ed., 1980) (arguing that the power of ideas often shapes regulation, even in the face of concentrated
political opposition); see also Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective. 38 STA.%- L
REv. 1189, 1293-94 (1986) (arguing that the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act.
among other initiatives, were not products of interest group politics); cf JERRY L MSHAW.
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 13 (1983) (discussing observations of administrative agencies that operate
independently and sensibly, even in the face of varied political pressure). To the extent that these scholars
have a point, justifications would matter not only in helping one discover what the nght outcome should
be but also in helping one achieve it.
One might also pose a historical hypothesis for the difference betcen the levels of fraud protection
in the capital and labor markets. Stability of and truthfulness in the capital market ssere to be protected by
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994). and the Secunties Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U S C §
78. Stability of and truthfulness in the labor market, on the other hand. were to be ensurcd by labor unions
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE INFORMATION IN THE LABOR MARKET
One possible justification for the lack of federal fraud protection for
workers is that information is not important, or not as important, in the labor
market as in the securities market. This part responds to that possible
justification by outlining the basic economic importance of information in
ensuring efficient markets and by applying these insights to the labor market.
This part then highlights why some of the costs of fraud are even greater in
the labor market. Because of this, one must reject the idea that the reason for
the absence of an antifraud law protecting workers is a reduced need for
information in this sphere.
A. The Basic Model
The idea that truth is a good thing, and falsity a bad one, is hardly new.
Truth is a central principle in many ethical systems, and falsehood is generally
condemned.'I° But truthfulness as a principle is borne out by economic, as
well as moral, theory.'05 It is routine, in fact, when one speaks in economic
terms, to maintain that accurate information is essential to a competitive
market and to "efficient" outcomes. 106
operating under the protection of the NLRA, an initiative "that recognized organized labor as a
countervailing force to big business." Rabin, supra, at 1252; cf Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union Local
6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing the duty of unions to represent
intelligently and effectively employees in collective bargaining with employers). As the strength of unions
has declined, workers have been able to rely on them less to protect themselves from employer fraud.
Meanwhile, as legal and nonlegal protection against fraud has increased in the capital markets, see supra
notes 54-66 and accompanying text, the differences between the protection available to workers and those
available to investors have grown as well.
104. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING 18 (1978) ("[S]ome level of truthfulness has always been seen
as essential to human society .... ).
105. This Article does not attempt to make a moral argument for an antifraud statute for workers. This
is not to say that moral arguments are meaningless in the public sphere but simply to acknowledge that this
Article focuses on legal, economic, and public policy arguments.
106. E.g., BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR MARKETS 241-42 (4th ed. 1994). Some
basic principles will help illustrate this argument. A competitive market allocates goods, services, labor,
and capital through variations in prices. When something (whether a tomato, a car, or an engineer) is highly
desired but in short supply, its price (or wage, in the case of the engineer) will rise, decreasing the quantity
demanded until the market clears. If something is in surplus, or not greatly desired, its price will fall until
the quantity demanded rises sufficiently to clear the market of any surplus goods. When the market clears,
it is in equilibrium because the quantity demanded of the item equals the quantity supplied.
This equilibrium state is seen as efficient because it allows both suppliers and buyers to allocate their
resources to uses that produce the most utility. This is one of the basic principles of economics: If voluntary
exchange through a market is permitted, resources will tend to gravitate toward their most valuable uses.
As Judge Posner writes, "By a process of voluntary exchange, resources are shifted to those uses in which
the value to consumers, as measured by their willingness to pay, is highest." POSNER, supra note 54, at II.
A widget manufacturer is willing to spend more for labor and materials than other potential users of those
resources only if she thinks she can use those resources to obtain a higher price for her finished widgets
than could the other users, Similarly, Company A is willing to pay an engineer a higher wage than
Company B only if his services are worth more to Company A than to Company B, meaning that A can
use him to produce a more valuable output, as measured by the prices consumers are willing to pay.
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In the labor market, jobs differ from one another in many characteristics:
the prestige of the position, the dangerousness of the work, the pleasantness
of the surroundings, the security of the job, and the level of the wages, to
name just a few. Workers do not choose which job to accept on the basis of
wages alone but on the whole package of attributes, both good and bad. For
equilibrium to occur in the labor market, the wage rate in jobs with more
desirable attributes must fall, and the wages in the less desirable jobs must
rise, until the total of advantages and disadvantages are equalized across jobs
available to a particular workert'7 Differences in rates of
pay-"compensating wage differentials"--equalize the net attractiveness of
jobs that offer different sets of attributes.'08
For the sake of simplicity, it is useful to isolate two attributes of work that
are likely to be important to workers choosing among possible jobs-wages
and job security. Job security is important to workers because a worker is not
likely to make her choice between jobs on the basis of which firm has the
highest present wage rate but rather on which provides the best future income
stream. If one company offers employment that is seasonal or less secure for
some other reason, the worker may choose to accept a position with a firm that
pays less but provides more security.
Now assume two firms are identical in every respect, except that Company
A is able to offer relatively secure employment and Company B is able to offer
only less secure employment.' °9 Assume also that the people in the labor
Thus efficient, voluntary exchange is possible only if people hase sufficient information to csaluate
the various uses for their resources. See. e.g., STEPHEN BREYER. REGt'LATIO% AND ITS Rn-oRm 26 (1982).
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 673 ("Fraud reduces allocative efficiency So too does an)
deficiency of information."). Usually, the necessary infortnaton is captured through the action of the price
system. That is, a producer of tin does not need to know the uses to shtch various competing bu)ers % ill
put the tin; the producer needs only to know how much each buyer is willing to pay for the tin See Hayek.
supra note 69, at 526-27. Fraud is unlawful, in part. because it distorts the pnce -system's ability to consey
information.
Without such information, firms will be unable to decide shether to dedicate their resources tonsard
building widgets or for some other use, and engineers will be fotled in choosing betseen Companis A and
B. If, for example, both companies were prohtbted from disclosing to the engineer the amount they would
pay him, the engineer would be unable to choose between them %ith certainty. and there sould be no
assurance that the engineer's labor would be dedicated to the use that society s alued the most (as measured
by the market valuation of his labor). It is important to note. howeser. that in some contexts the benefits
of the disclosure of information are outweighed by other values, such as the importance of privacy C'f.
e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacv and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information. 76 Ttix L REV
1, 4-5 (1997) (arguing that the unlimited disclosure of personal health care data is not economically
efficient).
107. See, e.g., KAUFMAN, supra note 106. at 372. For a stmilar analysis of the securities markets, see
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54. at 673.
108. Admittedly, this is a simplistic assumption. but it is helpful in comparing jobs that are similar
In jobs that require radically different skills, the effect of the labor supply on v, ages %kill likely swamtp the
effect of the compensating wage differential. That is why major league baseball players cam more than coal
miners even though mining coal is less desirable work. See. e.g. KALFIA',. supra note 106. at 377-78,
cf. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL EcONOMY 235 (Longmans. Green & Co 1900) t 1848)
(noting the simplicity of assumptions with regard to wage differentials)
109. In this portion of the analysis, the level of job security each company offers is assumed to be an
exogenous variable. This assumption will be relaxed in the follo%%ing section
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 715
market know which firms offer secure employment and which do not. If the
wage rate per hour were the same in both firms, everyone would want to work
for Company A because it offers equal pay and better job security. The surplus
of labor for Company A and the shortage of labor for Company B would cause
the wages at Company A to fall and those at Company B to rise until workers
were indifferent between the two companies. The wage in Company B would
have to be higher than the wage in Company A by an amount sufficient to
compensate- for the greater probability that there would be layoffs, plant
closings, or other job discontinuities."' In a competitive labor market (and
holding other factors equal), the company with better job security will be able
to offer a lower wage rate than the company with poor job security because
the latter company will have to pay a higher wage to entice workers to accept
the higher risk of job loss."'
This makes intuitive sense. Those employees working for the insecure
employment firm have to run the risk that they will suffer the costs of job
discontinuity. These costs will depend on such factors as the expected length
of time between jobs, the availability of information about other jobs, the
location (and indeed existence) of other work, and whether a replacement job
will pay the same." 2 The difference between the wages offered by the secure
employment firm and the wages offered by the insecure one will therefore
differ greatly in different markets. One would expect that a firm offering
secure employment in Youngstown, where alternate employment is probably
scarce, would be able to pay a significantly lower wage than insecure
employment firms in the same area or secure employment firms elsewhere.
This situation might explain why the management of U.S. Steel thought it so
110. See John M. Abowd & Orley Ashenfelter, Anticipated Unemployment, Temporary Layoffs, and
Compensating Wage Differentials, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 141, 143-45 (Sherwin Rosen ed., 198 1);
see also KAUFMAN, supra note 106, at 373 (discussing the effect of seasonal employment on wage
compensation).
11l. See Abowd & Ashenfelter, supra note 110, at 144-45. Note that this analysis would essentially
be the same for any two conditions of employment. To the extent that Company A offers a non-wage
benefit (whether safer working conditions or better cafeteria lunches), Company B must increase its wages
to compensate.
112. Another complexity should be noted here as well. One additional factor in the difference between
the wages at the secure employment firm and the insecure employment firm will be the elasticity of the
labor supply, i.e., the variance in the laborer's preference for work over leisure and other uses of time as
the wage increases. The more "elastic" the labor supply, the more the supply of labor will change for any
given change in the wage rate. See, e.g., KAUFMAN, supra note 106, at 59-62 & n.10.
Many studies show that the labor supply curve for both men and women is very inelastic, that is, for
every one percent wage increase, the hours worked will increase considerably less than one percent. See,
e.g., id. at 60-62. The more inelastic the labor supply, the greater the compensating differential will be
between the wage rate at the secure employment firm and the insecure employment firm. See Abowd &
Ashenfelter, supra note 110, at 147. This is because the insecure employment firm will have to increase
its wages significantly in order to entice a sufficient number of workers to join it. In other words, let us
assume that if the insecure employment firm paid no wage differential it would have a labor shortage of
10%. If the supply of labor were elastic, the firm would be able to increase its work force sufficiently by
increasing its wages by less than 10%. If the supply were inelastic, it would have to increase its wages by
more than 10%.
Labor Fraud
important to assure its employees that their employment was secure;'"3 with
secure employment, the workers would demand a markedly lower wage than
if their jobs were insecure.
It is important to recognize that it is a good (read "efficient") thing from
society's point of view that insecure employment firms must offer higher
wages to fill their jobs than secure ones because different individuals have
various tastes for security and risk." 4 Some workers will prefer to have a
secure job rather than an insecure one that offers a wage that is fully
compensatory of the expected financial losses arising from any future job loss.
Others will prefer the riskier job with a higher possible payoff. Even if the
expected financial benefit of both jobs were the same (that is, if the probability
of the payoff multiplied by the amount of the payoff were equal in both firms)
and even if everything else were equal, some people would still prefer the
risky job and others would prefer the secure job.
That different people have different preferences for risk and security is an
important part of this story because it helps explain why a competitive, fully
informed market makes everybody better off. If a worker prefers job security
more than her fellow workers (that is, if she is risk averse), she can choose to
work for a company that offers more secure employment, though with lower
wages. In effect, she can purchase job security with a portion of her wages. If
a worker does not need or want job security as much as her fellow workers,
she is free to accept a job with the firm with less security but with higher
wages. In effect, she can sell her preference for risk (or lack of desire for job
security) in exchange for a higher wage. Both workers are able to maximize
their job satisfaction, or utility, by giving up what they value less (for example,
the extra dollar in wage) for what they value more (the extra amount of job
security). The workers have achieved allocational efficiency; they have
allocated their labor in such a way as to maximize their utility, within the
constraints of the market." 5
Not only is this result better for workers, but firms also become more
efficient when a competitive market requires truthful information. Secure
employment firms will want to sell their security in the labor market by
offering lower wages, and insecure employment firms will need to purchase
(through higher wages) workers' willingness to be subject to job
discontinuities. If workers can learn which firms provide secure employment
and which do not, the operation of the competitive labor market will mean that
113. See notes 6-16 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice. 42 EMORY
L.J. 1, 18-26 (1983) (discussing the positive worth of nsk and nsk-seeking)
115. Again, the analysis would be the same if we were comparing wages and workplace safety (or
lunchroom food, or size of office space, or any other condition of employment) rather than %%ages and
security. Some workers will value any one of these factors more than their coworkers, and the market will
ensure that workers who value those things more will allocate themselves to the fims that offer them at
lowest cost.
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risk preferrers will end up in the firms providing risky employment and risk
avoiders will end up in the firms offering secure employment. The market
ensures that each firm satisfies its needs at minimum cost. Because secure
employment firms can sell their security to risk-averse workers, they will be
able to decrease their labor costs more than they would if workers did not
know which firms were risky and which were secure. Similarly, because
insecure employment firms can purchase a willingness to be subject to risk
from risk preferrers, their labor costs will be less than if they had to purchase
the same amount of risk bearing from a cross section of workers." 6 Another
way to say this is that the market will induce a sorting process that will match
firms with employees and attain the appropriate mix of labor and job security
at minimum cost to the firm.1
7
The analogy to capital markets is straightforward." 8 With accurate
information, risk-averse investors can place their investment funds in financial
vehicles that offer a secure return and low volatility. Businesses in secure, low-
volatility market sectors can entice capital investment at lower cost from these
risk-averse investors than they can from a broader group of investors because
the risk-averse investors will pay a portion of their returns in exchange for
security. Risk-prone investors will similarly be able to find investment vehicles
that offer their preferred mix of expected return and risk. Businesses in highly
volatile industry sectors will have a lower cost of capital than they would if
they had to seek capital from a larger group of investors. Without accurate
information, the market price will not reflect the value of the underlying
securities. As the drafters of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act stated in the
House Report on the Act, "There cannot be honest markets without honest
publicity."9
116. There is a complexity that should be noted here although it is discussed further below. See infra
notes 122-123 and accompanying text. If the risky company is able to mislead the workers in the labor
market into believing that the company is less risky than it in fact is, the company is robbing society of
a portion of its allocational efficiency. Some of the difference is deadweight loss, and some is redistributed
to the company that lies.
117. See, e.g., Abowd & Ashenfelter, supra note I10, at 149-50. Similarly, if workers differ in the
elasticity of their supply of labor, the workers with the highest elasticity will be sorted into firms that have
the greatest amount of job discontinuities (for example, seasonal employment). This allows the firm to
achieve its demanded employment flexibility at the lowest cost.
118. Cf Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 673 (describing how securities markets match
prospects, managers, and funds).
119. See H.R. REf P. No. 73-1383, at I1 (1934), reprinted in I SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 67, at 793, 804. The full passage reads:
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities ... without having an intelligent
basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. The idea of a
free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and
sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation where the market price reflects
as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function
of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation
of the markets as indices of real value. There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.
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What happens when we assume the labor market does not enjoy "honest
publicity"? As we have seen, when workers know which firms offer secure
employment and which offer insecure employment, the market induces wage
adjustments so that each firm is able to hire the number and type of workers
it demands. These equilibrium points are seen as optimal from a societal point
of view because any movement away from them imposes more costs than
benefits. For example, if employment in the insecure employment firm is
forced up artificially, the social costs of providing the extra work are greater
than the social benefits gained through the extra work. Analogously, if the
employment levels in the firm providing secure employment are held
artificially low, society is losing potential benefits. At any point below the
equilibrium amount of hours worked, the benefits of employing a worker for
an additional hour are greater than the costs of providing the extra hour.
Fraudulent information in the labor market tends to cause this very effect.
Consider what happens when firms are able to lie about the security of the
employment they offer. When lying is allowed, workers will not be able to tell
the difference between a secure firm that is telling the truth and an insecure
firm that is lying. Hence workers will be unable to demand a wage differential
from insecure firms because they will not know from which firms to demand
it. Similarly, secure firms will be unable to offer lower wages than insecure
firms because workers will not be able to tell if the secure firms are telling the
truth about the security of the jobs offered. Instead, workers will be forced to
calculate their willingness to work based on assumptions about the relative
proportion of secure versus insecure jobs in the marketplace. In other words,
they will view all firms as average and make their decisions about where to
work accordingly.120 The supply of labor for both firms will be somewhere
between what would have been the supply for the secure and the insecure
employment firms and would reflect the workers' beliefs about the probability
that the firm they work for is secure or insecure. Moreover, one would expect
that the cost of labor for the economy as a whole would rise because workers
would have to be compensated for being subject to fraud by their employers.
False information thus has serious consequences. Firms that offer insecure
employment are able to decrease the wages they pay their employees, even
though the underlying insecurity of the employment they offer has not
changed. Also, because they no longer have to pay a wage differential,
insecure employment firms will demand more workers. Secure employment
firms, on the other hand, are forced to pay a higher wage, even though the
underlying security of the employment they offer has not changed. Because
they are forced to pay a higher wage, the secure employment firms will tend
120. Cf Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54. at 673 (noting that sccunttic, inctor, lacking
sufficient information will view all secunties as average) Some sorkers might be able to search out and
discover which employers are lying, but such search is unlikely to be cost-free Thew costs could be
avoided by a rule against fraud. See ifra notes 292-294 and accompan)tng tc.t
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to employ fewer workers. At the end of the day, too many people (from the
societal perspective) are working for the insecure employment firm, and too
few are working at the secure employment firm; the wages at the secure
employment firm are too high, and the wages at the insecure employment firm
are too low.121
Of course, while this scenario is inefficient overall, the skewing of the
information available in the market is favorable to some. The workers who
retain their jobs in secure employment firms will be making a higher wage.
The shareholders of insecure employment firms, or more precisely, the
shareholders of insecure employment firms that lie about the riskiness of the
employment they offer, will benefit from the opportunity to employ more
workers at a lower wage. But people suffer in this scenario as well. Because
wages at secure employment firms will be (artificially) increased, they will not
be able to employ as many workers. Some of their employees will be thrown
out of their jobs. If these laid-off workers find jobs at untruthful, insecure
employment firms, they will be working for less than they would demand if
they knew about the insecurity of their employment. Workers at untruthful,
insecure employment firms will have their wages cut. Quite a number of
investors will lose as well. Truthful, insecure employment firms will suffer
financially because they bear an unfair competitive disadvantage vis-i-vis
untruthful, insecure employment firms. Shareholders of secure employment
firms will also lose because those firms will no longer be able to offer lower
wages because of the security of the employment they offer. Although this
scenario creates some "winners," the losers have lost more than the winners
have won. Incomplete information has moved us away from the socially
optimal equilibrium.
Over time, the harmful effects multiply. Because the profits of secure
employment firms will tend to fall and the profits of (untruthful) insecure
employment firms will tend to rise, some secure employment firms will go out
of business (or, said another way, will become insecure employment firms).
The market will begin to be dominated by insecure employment firms. The lies
of the insecure employment firms not only will have hurt their own workers
but will have dragged down the market as a whole. 122
Lack of accurate information about job security (or, for that matter, about
any other employment condition valued by employees) will cause workers to
allocate their labor to inefficient uses and will force employers offering secure
employment to pay more in wages than they would need to if workers had
121. For a similar analysis applied to the securities markets, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
54, at 673-74.
122. Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and tile Market
Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488, 495 (1970) (describing how dishonest dealings "tend to drive honest
dealings out of the market"); Farber & Matheson, supra note 24, at 928 (relating a similar analysis as an
explanation for the need to enforce promissory estoppel doctrine).
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correct information. Fewer workers will be employed by firms offering secure
employment, and more workers will be employed by firms offering insecure
employment. The story thus far is sufficient to show that, as in the capital
market, the need for correct information is important to ensure allocative
efficiency in the labor market.
23
B. Job Security as an Endogenous Variable
There is an additional reason that the law should seek to ensure accurate
information in the labor market by prohibiting fraud against employees. Up to
this point, this analysis has assumed that the level of risk of job discontinuity
is a fixed, exogenous variable, something which each firm accepts as given and
which is unaffected by company policy or practices.' 24 This assumption is
certainly correct in many respects because companies are subject to market
forces they cannot control and some industries are inherently more risky in this
sense than others. Yet this assumption is incorrect in other ways because the
incidence of job discontinuity is partially a function of planning, company
policy, management, capital investment, and marketing.'2
Thus the amount of job security that a company provides is something that
the company can affect. Some efforts to reduce the incidence of job
discontinuities will impose costs on the firm.' 26 But they need not be large
costs; indeed, the company may be able to decrease the incidence of job
discontinuity cheaply by, for example, planning production schedules more
carefully or buying more advertisements. But it is to be expected that the cost
of reducing job discontinuities will increase as the rate of job discontinuities
falls and it becomes increasingly difficult to find simple and low-cost methods
of reducing job risk. In other words, a firm faces increasing marginal costs of
preventing job discontinuities.
Significantly, however, a firm does not only incur additional costs with
improvements in job security. It also realizes the monetary benefit based on the
wage differential for secure employment firms. When a company decreases the
incidence of job discontinuity its workers must suffer, it will be able to attract
a work force at a lower wage rate. As we have seen, the threat of job
discontinuity is something that, other things being equal, workers would rather
123. One cannot, however, say on the basis of the discussion thus far whether the need for regulation
is necessary in the labor market or whether the need for such regulation is as great or greater than in the
securities market. See infra Section II.C.
124. See supra note 109.
125. For example, the layoffs in the steel mills of Youngstown came in pan because of the failure of
U.S. Steel to invest in the modernization of its facilities. See LYND. supra note 5. at 16 By some accounts.
the potential closure of Warnaco's Hathaway shirt factory, see supra note 26. came in pan because of the
failure of the company to dedicate resources necessary to market the shirts effecti.ely See Rimer. supra
note 26 (noting that Warnaco "had long since all but stopped advertsing Hathaway shirts nationally")
126. The following discussion is analogous to that provided in KAUFMAN. supra note 106. at 392-98.
on the provision of health and safety protection.
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avoid. As the incidence of job discontinuity increases, informed workers
demand a higher risk premium for each additional amount of risk.'27 Thus,
as the rate of job discontinuity increases, firms will have to pay a higher and
higher wage premium. As they decrease the risk of job discontinuity, they
receive a benefit by way of the lower wages they can pay to attract
workers.'28
When deciding how much to spend on preventing job discontinuities, a
firm must consider both the monetary cost and monetary benefit of reducing
such discontinuities. The optimal level of expenditures is at the level where the
cost of prevention and the marginal cost of discontinuity are equivalent.
Consider the possibility that firms will mislead workers about the security of
their employment. If firms can lie with impunity, all firms will have incentives
to mislead their workers into believing that their jobs are more secure than
they are. With such widespread mendacity, workers likely would not demand
a fully compensatory risk premium in wages. They will probably assume that
their jobs are more secure than they are in fact and thereby demand less of a
wage differential to compensate them for that additional risk.'29 In such a
case, the company's marginal cost of job discontinuity would be falsely
deflated. Because the costs of job discontinuity would be held falsely low, a
firm would tend to spend less on the prevention of job discontinuities. The
false equilibrium brought about by fraud would thus tend to involve a higher
level of job insecurity than if fraud were not present. Incomplete information,
therefore, not only takes us away from allocational efficiency but plausibly
results in a greater number of job discontinuities such as layoffs and plant
closings. Allowing fraud in the labor market decreases the benefits firms gain
from offering security and decreases the costs firms bear from providing
insecurity, which makes insecurity more likely.
127. This is because, in the aggregate, most people are assumed to be risk averse, i.e., they have an
increasing aversion to additional increments of risk. See id. at 394-95.
128. Cf id. (discussing, in the context of health and safety provisions, that if firms are required to
reduce injury rates below an optimal level they must offer workers lower wages in order to stay in
business). If a firm has a greater level of discontinuity than that represented by its optimal point, it will
increase its preventative expenditures because the benefit of lower labor costs will outweigh the costs of
prevention. If a company has a level of discontinuity that is less than optimal, an increase in wages to
compensate workers for additional insecurity will cost less than the savings in prevention costs.
129. This would at least be the short term effect and would last until workers learned that they could
not rely on any statement from their employer pertaining to job security. The length of time in which this
is likely to occur begs reference to Keynes's famous aphorism that "[11n the long run, we are all dead."
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923). In the long run, workers'
willingness to accept lower wages in return for representations about job security would decrease as well.
The demands of workers would then depend in part on workers' evaluations of the likely number of firms
offering secure employment and firms offering insecure employment. One might even observe that in firms
that offer secure employment, workers will require higher wages per incidence of job discontinuity because
they can no longer rely on their company's representation of continued job security. In the long term,
therefore, the continuance of the effects mentioned in the text will depend on whether there are more
insecure employment firms that would benefit from a rule allowing fraud or more secure employment firms
that would lose from such a rule.
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C. Some Additional Costs of Fraud in the Labor Market
Much that has been said thus far about the importance of information in
the labor market is also true in the capital market, but there are differences as
well. Several distinctions provide justifications for concluding that antifraud
rules are more important in the labor market than in the capital market.
It is important to note at the outset of the discussion, however, that the
capital market's greater national scope and efficiency might appear to argue for
greater protection than in the labor market. The national exchanges facilitate
a highly efficient and very important system for security sales and purchases.
If a company issues stock using misleading statements, the fraud will be
incorporated into the prices of the company's stock, wherever the purchaser
might be. Moreover, if fraud is not punished effectively, investors will
eventually lose confidence in the securities market and will tend to shift to
alternative methods of investing. Because the health of, and confidence in,
national exchanges is vital to a strong national economy, fraud protection for
such markets is seen as essential.
Labor markets, on the other hand, are less efficient and less national. If a
company fraudulently assures workers in Ohio that their jobs are secure, such
fraud is unlikely to affect workers in California greatly. Labor fraud is likely
to have local, or perhaps regional effects, rather than national ones. In addition,
one might argue, confidence in the labor market is less essential to the health
of the national economy. Labor markets do not depend on a national labor
"exchange," the success of which turns on the confidence of workers that it is
not tainted by fraud. While investors have more alternatives and could throw
the markets into a tailspin if fraud were quotidian, workers have to work. It is
more important, one would say, to erect national fraud protection for the
capital market than for the labor market.
This argument goes too far. Because it is less efficient and fluid, the labor
market certainly is less sensitive to changes in worker "confidence" than the
capital market is to investor confidence. But the sensitivity of the capital
market also makes it more likely that fraud will be found out without the
intervention of legal rules, as the incentives for monitoring the validity of
company statements are quite high. Much money can be made by sniffing out
fraud and either using such information to inform one's own trades or selling
the information to other investors.130 It is less likely that private monitors for
fraud will spring up in the labor market; the opportunities for arbitrage do not
exist. '3
130. See infra notes 296-298 and accompanying text. Yet. cen with these pnratc mechanisms. legal
protection against fraud in the capital markets is still seen as essential
131. See infra notes 301-302 and accompanying text
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Furthermore, even if the labor market is less national than the capital
market, it is certainly national enough to provide the basis for federal fraud
protection. Employer fraud often creates an interstate effect, more obviously
at some times than at others.'32 Its national effect would be at least as high
as other aspects of the employment relation subject to federal control . 33
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the law surrounding labor
agreements and collective bargaining "is 'peculiarly one that calls for uniform
law' because "the possibility that individual contract terms might have
different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a
disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective
agreements."'134 The concern that words-the terms of understanding between
employers and employees-be allowed to have a consistent meaning across
jurisdictional boundaries would argue for a national fraud law just as strongly
as for a national collective bargaining law.
One basis for concluding that the need for fraud protection is particularly
strong in the labor market is that, from a macroeconomic perspective, fraud in
the labor market arguably creates more allocative inefficiency than much of the
fraud that occurs in the capital market. As was explained above,' 35 the
securities laws make actionable not only the deceit that occurs in the initial
distribution of securities, but also fraud that affects trades in the secondary
market. As Paul Mahoney has explained, "Lies told in secondary markets have
smaller allocative effects than those told in primary markets."'136 Deceit in
the secondary market does not cause the misdirection of financial capital to the
issuer but rather the misdirection of shares among traders. Because the shares
are not themselves the productive asset, "the overall efficiency consequences
of putting noncontrolling shares of stock in the hands of one investor rather
than another [are] small."' 137
In contrast, the fraud of concern in the labor market-employers
misleading employees to entice them to stay in or accept a job-is in the
primary market. The workers' labor is itself the productive asset, and a
132. Allegedly fraudulent employer representations have at times lured workers across state lines. See,
e.g., Lazar v. Superior Ct., 909 P.2d 981 (cal. 1996) (examining whether an employer fraudulently enticed
a potential employee to move from New York to Los Angeles to accept a job), discussed infra note 271;
Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (per
curiam) (rejecting a fraud claim against General Motors for moving its plant production capacity from
Michigan to Texas), discussed infra note 272; Lewis, supra note 27 (examining a case in which workers
were lured to move from Tennessee to Massachusetts with apparently false promises of lucrative work).
133. For example, collective bargaining, see, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 15 1-169
(1994), the minimum wage, see 29 U.S.C. § 206, occupational safety, see Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, and employee benefits, see Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, are all regulated at the national level.
134. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) (quoting Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)).
135. See supra text accompanying note 63.
136. Mahoney, supra note 52, at 633.
137. Id. at 633-34.
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misallocation of that asset from a higher-value use to a lower-value use inflicts
deadweight loss on society in every case. This deadweight loss can be severe.
If we make the reasonable assumption, for example, that the kind of deceit that
allegedly occurred in U.S. Steel's Youngstown facilities was not unique in the
declining steel industry of the late 1970s and early 1980s, or in manufacturing
generally during that time period, it is easy to see that such fraud could have
had significant macroeconomic effects. Labor resources were hindered from
moving efficiently from steel to more productive pursuits, and when the
inevitable eventually occurred, the massive plant closings caused economic
shocks that sent state and regional economies reeling. 
31
That financial capital is more fluid than human capital means that fraud
in the labor market hurts workers in ways that capital investors need not suffer.
As Daniel Fischel has observed, "Investors in capital markets are protected by
the virtually infinite number of investment substitutes."" 9 Companies
compete for capital investment, and if an investor is dissatisfied with the
performance of a particular investment, she can usually sell it with little
difficulty and at little cost. If a firm has misled capital investors with regard
to, say, potential for investment gains, investors can generally find substitute
investment vehicles in short order. They will have suffered loss, to be sure, but
their loss can be minimized by rapidly transferring the funds from the
defrauding firm to a truthful firm.
On the other hand, as Fischel states, "fewer substitutes exist for labor
opportunities."' 4 Being unemployed or even self-employed is a less efficient
substitute for a steel worker who loses her job than placing money in the bank
is for an investor who must sell her stock in the steel company. An investor
can find a multitude of alternative uses for disposable cash; a steel worker has
many fewer alternatives for her skills. Cash does not need to be "retrained"
before it can be used profitably again, but an unemployed steelworker might
need such retraining.
Moreover, while investors in the securities markets typically can leave the
market completely at little cost, the "exit option" is much more costly for
workers. Workers simply cannot move as quickly as capital; think of the costs
of a worker leaving Youngstown and relocating to Texas, or for that matter
Indonesia, compared to moving an amount of capital between the same locales.
The exit option may in fact become more costly the longer the employee stays
in her job. To the extent that the worker develops firm-specific skills or
138. Econometric studies reveal that advance notice of layoffs tends to reduce the length of
unemployment workers suffer after the layoff. See, e.g.. John T. Addison & Pedro Portugal. Advance Notice
and Unemployment: New Evidence from the 1988 Displaced Worker Survey. 45 INDUS. & LAB. REi- REV.
645, 658 (1992) (concluding that advance notice is associated with a reduction in joblessness for most
categories of workers); see also id. at 660 tbl.AI (discussing other econometnc analyses on point).
139. Fischel, supra note 4, at 1065.
140. Id. at 1066.
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develops other links to a particular job or place, she becomes more dependent
on the firm for continued employment. Thus, workers' ability to leave firms
tends to become more constrained the longer they work for particular
employers. The costs of employer fraud will therefore tend to be quite high
when the employees affected are long-term employees.
There is yet another way in which fraud in the labor market is more costly
than in the capital market. Capital investors can protect themselves ex ante
from fraud by placing their funds in a number of different investment vehicles.
From the standpoint of the individual investor, the risk of fraud can be seen
as simply another risk of the market. While one firm might commit fraud on
its investors, it is unlikely that many will do so at any one time. The costs of
being victimized by fraud will be less when only a portion of one's
investments are in the defrauding firm. Workers are much less able to protect
themselves ex ante through diversification.' 4 1 Investors can put their eggs in
many different baskets; full-time workers have only one egg and must place
it in only one basket. In more economic terms, human capital is difficult to
diversify because employees are unable to divide their labor resources-efforts
and knowledge and skill-among a large number of firms. Employees are thus
especially vulnerable to fraud by their employers because any cost they suffer
is felt across their human capital "portfolio" rather than merely in one portion
of it.
142
There is one final way in which fraud in the labor market is particularly
costly. By definition, capital investors use savings to purchase stock. In
addition, for most investors the income and capital gains from investments are
not typically necessary for subsistence. A job, on the other hand, is much more
closely tied to survival. For most, work is the method by which one gathers
the necessities of life. One could generalize, then, and say that when a
company defrauds an investor about an investment, the damage is to savings.
When a company defrauds a worker about her work, the damage is to
subsistence.
In the labor market as in the capital market, information matters. The
damage of false or incorrect information is severe to workers, employers, and
society in general. In addition, costs are present in the labor context that are
absent from the securities one. Thus, unless some other factor is present, the
141. See id. at 1067.
142. These two points, that fraud is particularly costly in the labor market because of the scarcity of
adequate substitutes and that it is particularly costly because of workers' inability to diversify their risk,
apply much more persuasively on the employee's side of the equation than on the employer's. An employer
need worry about fraud from employees much less than vice versa because employers are typically better
able to find adequate substitutes and are generally better able to diversify away the risk that some
employees are deceiving them in some material way. The case for federal fraud protection in the labor
market is thus much stronger vis-ih-vis employers' deceit of employees than vis-A-vis employees' fraud of
employers, The statute proposed infra in Part V, therefore, makes only the former actionable.
[Vol. 107: 715
Labor Fraud
conclusion that statutory protection is a good thing in the securities market43
is sufficient to demonstrate that it should exist in the labor market. Whether
any such contrary factor exists is the question to which this Article now turns.
III. THE POSSIBILITY OF MARKET SELF-CORRECTION
The insights set out in Part II do not necessarily provide a rationale for
regulation, much less for regulation on the federal level. "" Government
regulation of fraud may be unnecessary because the market will self-correct;
perhaps competitive pressures will penalize fraud sufficiently that a rule against
it is unnecessary.'45 This argument is based on the insight that sellers of a
good cannot lie costlessly about the qualities of the good. Some purchasers
will seek to verify the representations before purchase, and, to the extent the
representations were misleading, the potential purchaser will likely go
elsewhere. Even if the purchaser fails to verify the seller's statements at the
time of purchase, any misrepresentation will decrease the probability of repeat
purchases. Moreover, "Many sellers have competitors anxious to expose
misstatements." '46 Finally, firms that genuinely offer superior products will
seek ways to bond their statements (with warranties, for example), to provide
purchasers the opportunity to verify the seller's representations (through
inspection or trial use periods, for example), or to allow third parties (outside
accounting firms or consumers' groups) to check the truthfulness of the sellers'
statements. 1
47
But, as Easterbrook and Fischel remind us, these market corrections will
not work perfectly. Sellers of low-quality products can partly frustrate
verification by "mimic[king] the disclosure of ascertainable facts while making
bogus statements about things buyers cannot verify."' Some sellers will not
care about repeat transactions. Itinerant vendors, for example, "have no brand
name to protect and seldom engage in multiple transactions with the same
buyer, so they have strong incentives to misrepresent the quality of their wares
in order to obtain a higher price."'
' 49
143. See supra Section I.B.
144. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54. at 674 ("One cannot leap from the difficulties of a
market with asymmetric information to the conclusion that there is need for regulation--'cn such mild
regulation as a prohibition of fraud.").
145. Even if the market does not self-correct, one would also need to argue that regulation would be
less costly than the continuation of nonregulation. Moreover, to the extent that the proposed antifraud law
for the labor market would be federal in scope, one would have to provide a basis to believe that a federal
remedy would be more effective than protection rooted in state law. These issues are discussed ifra in Part
V.
146. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54. at 674 n.7.
147. See id. at 675.
148. Id. at 674.
149. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51. at 95.
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Even with the possibility of repeat purchases, sellers of low-quality items
may often find that, as Easterbrook and Fischel put it, "the gains from one-shot
deception [are] greater than the reputational loss";t"' that is, "some firms will
find fraud to be the project with the highest net present value."',' In
addition, certain products are simply not subject to accurate verification. Many
securities, for example, constitute an interest in unique projects; in such case,
"neither competitors' statements nor the prospect of repeat purchases will
impose restraints, and it is very hard for a buyer to verify statements before the
sale."'
152
Market corrections are difficult in the labor market as well. Many workers
will find it difficult, if not impossible, to verify employers' or potential
employers' statements with regard to the safety of the workplace, job security,
or certain employment benefits. 53 Moreover, the labor market enjoys less
protection from private monitors than does the capital market."' While the
capital market could rely on a number of private mechanisms to monitor fraud,
unions are labor's best hope for ferreting out employers' misstatements.
Unions, however, are in a period of historical weakness.1
55
Even when verification and bonding are possible, they impose costs on the
market transactions, and these costs are not always borne by the fraudulent
party. These costs decrease the aggregate amount of commercial activity-if
a widget purchaser has to spend five percent of the purchase price to verify the
quality of the widgets she buys, she can purchase fewer widgets. If the high-
quality supplier of widgets has to offer a warranty that adds five percent to the
cost of providing the widget, then she too will sell fewer widgets. Moreover,
to the extent that these verification and bonding devices are imperfect, sellers
will begin to lose confidence in the market as a whole; they will tend to
discount the quality of all the widgets in the market. 56 Buyers will no longer
be willing to spend as much as previously, even on good widgets, because they
will be less sure that they are in fact buying good widgets. The makers of
good widgets will tend to exit the market because they cannot get a fair price
for their product. The market will then come to be dominated by makers of
poor widgets. 
57
150. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 675.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 674 n.7; see also Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market:
The Tortured Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMIt L. REv. 671.
695 (1995) (arguing that verification costs are particularly high in financial markets). Indeed, only a limited
amount of information can be verified at all in the securities markets. Investors cannot deduce future profits
or risks of a business venture and would not want to spend their resources doing that even if they could.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 674-75. Employees face the same difficulties when evaluating
the prospects of a potential employer's business.
153. See infra notes 203-205, 301-302 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
156. This analysis tracks that offered in Stout, supra note 84, at 713.
157. See Akerlof, supra note 122, at 495.
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One would expect that this effect would also occur in the labor market.
Honest employers will have to expend resources to bond their statements,
making it more expensive for them to hire any given amount of labor. To the
extent that bonding and verification are imperfect, employees will tend to lose
confidence in the labor market as a whole, making them less likely to enter the
labor market in the first place and to demand higher wages if they do.
A rule against fraud can mitigate these effects. As Easterbrook and Fischel
explain, a penalty for fraud makes it more costly for firms providing low-
quality products (or employment, one might add) to use false disclosures to
mimic firms providing high-quality products or employment; the fraud penalty,
meanwhile, imposes no or low costs on honest firms providing high-quality
products or employment. 158 In fact, the rule against fraud decreases the costs
that firms providing high-quality products or employment need to expend to
certify their products. The costs of providing high-quality products or
employment will fall while the costs of passing off low-quality products or
employment will increase.
Of course, antifraud rules will themselves not operate perfectly, and they
will impose costs of their own. To the extent that they are underenforced, or
that the penalties imposed are too low to deter fraudulent conduct, firms
providing high-quality products or employment may still need to use some
additional certification devices.' 59  In order to enforce the rule, the
government will have to dedicate resources to investigating, prosecuting,
adjudicating, and punishing fraudulent activity. If the rule is overenforced or
enforced inaccurately, honest firms will incur expenses protecting themselves
from possible liability.160 Without a detailed empirical analysis, it is difficult
to prove conclusively that the costs of a rule against fraud outweigh the
benefits.' 6' But rules against fraud are indeed ubiquitous. 62 They have
been a concern of the common law for centuries, 63 and they are presently
found in the laws of all fifty states and of the federal government.' If the
costs of such rules outweighed their benefits, one would expect to see at least
some jurisdictions without such rules.
158. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 677.
159. Cf id. (noting that verification expenses go down for high quality securities if informational
warranties are generally enforced).
160. See id. at 678; cf Brudney, supra note 54, at 733 n.31 (noting that hindsight often exposcs
corporate enterprises to liability if projections are unfulfilled): Stout. supra note 84. at 715 (admitting that
securities fraud "[sltrike suits may ... be imposing significant costs on United States firms")
161. For a "back of the envelope" calculation that the benefits of a rule against fraud in the securities
markets far outweigh the costs of such a rule, see Stout. supra note 84. at 714-15
162. See supra Section I.A.
163. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
164. See JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACM. AND PRA("lCE- s 31 (3d ed 1991)
("Every state and the District of Columbia have enacted at least one statute with broad applicability to most
consumer transactions, aimed at preventing consumer deception and abuse in the marketplace."}. see also
id. app. A at 527-42 (providing a state-by-state analysis of each statute).
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Of course, too much can be made of this descriptive point, especially since
this Article's argument would collapse if the absence of an effective fraud
remedy in the labor market could be taken to provide a normative argument
not to have such a remedy. Perhaps the better way to proceed is to note that
one sees little evidence of a move away from fraud protection in general.
Notwithstanding some recent moves to reduce the costs to businesses of
defending against strike suits and to provide corporate officials some safe
harbors for future-regarding statements, 165 there remains a consensus in the
academy and in politics that, on the whole, antifraud law is beneficial.166 It
would seem reasonable, then, for a proponent of protection against fraud in the
labor market to take as a starting point not the justification of fraud law
generally but the accounting of likely costs and benefits of fraud protection for
the labor market in particular.
IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF RELYING ON COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Perhaps the lack of federal statutory protection against fraud in the labor
market can be explained on the basis that it is simply duplicative of existing
remedies. One might suppose, for example, that contract law would be an
adequate safeguard against employer deceit. Workers could claim that the
employers' statements were legally binding promises or negotiate with their
employers to ensure that they had enforceable agreements. Another possible
source of protection could come from the common law of tort. One might
suggest, then, that the lack of federal statutory protection for workers requires
them to depend on a different source of protection from investors, that is, the
common law, but that the actual amount of protection is unlikely to be much
different. To the extent contract or tort law provides adequate protection
against fraud, a federal statute is unnecessary. This part analyzes whether either
of these common law remedies provides the efficient level of fraud protection.
A. Why Contract Law Is Not Enough
Many of the types of representations that are important to workers pertain
to the future and appear to be promises: "We will not close the plant as long
as it is profitable," or, "You will have medical insurance for life." One might
naturally propose, therefore, that contract law provides the necessary protection
for workers even if tort law does not. There are a number of reasons, however,
that workers should not be forced to depend solely on contract law to guard
against deceitful practices by their employers.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
166. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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First, the tort of deceit has been seen to add something separate from
contract law for over two centuries. 67 It is odd to ask workers, then, to
depend on contract remedies when other market participants such as capital
investors need not limit their avenues of redress. Contract law is essential for
workers and other market participants, of course, but one should not fall into
an unconsidered assumption that it is all that is essential. Contract law is
essentially about promises.t 6s The tort law of deceit is about false statements
that induce reliance. Some false statements that induce reasonable reliance will
be promissory in nature (e.g., "We will not close the plant if it remains
profitable"); others will not be (e.g., "The plant is now profitable"). Statements
of the latter variety are not enforceable promises, and those of the former
variety may not be either, even given their forward-looking natures.6 But
both kinds of false statements might indeed induce someone reasonably to rely
on them. 7° Therefore, if contract law were the only option for workers, they
would be underprotected from employer fraud.
Also, if workers could depend on contract law alone, they and employers
would be forced to bargain about their relationship to a much greater extent,
increasing the costliness of agreements. If default contract rules do not protect
employees, then employers might be forced to write their commitments into
the employment contract or otherwise warranty their statements. Unless they
can depend on legal fraud protection, employees will be unlikely to rely on
167. See Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K B 1789) (sescnng the prestousl) necessary
connection between misrepresentation and a contract), see also supra note 32
168. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH. CONTRACTS 9 (1982) (observing that. "'From the perspectie of
society as a whole, the function of the law of contracts might have been seen as furhenng the general
economic good by encouraging parties to enter into,.. transactions'" based on an exchange of promises,
and that it "was essential to provide a general basis for the enforcement of promises")
169. Remember the Youngstown case tn this context. See supra notes 5-24 and accompan)ing text
Many of the statements there were promtssory tn nature, yet the plaintiffs lost thetr promtssor) estoppel
claim in the district court on the grounds that the statements did not constitute promises See Local 1330.
United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp.. 631 F2d 1264. 1277 (6th Ctr 1980) Also consider tn
this context the many cases arising under ERISA concerning compan) statements about "*lfcttme'" benefits
Many of these cases, decided on contract reasoning, hold that such statements do not nse to the lecel of
enforceable contracts, usually because of "reservation of rights'" clauses See, e g. Sprague v General
Motors Corp., 92 F.3d 1425, 1434 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Untsys Corp Retiree Med Benefit "ERISA"
Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 902-03 (3d Cir. 1995); Moore v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 856 F2d 488, 489 (2d
Cir. 1988). But see Armistead v. Vernitron Corp.. 944 F.2d 1287, 1299-300 (6th Cir 1991) (using equitable
estoppel doctrine to protect employees from the effects of misleadtng representattons conceming retiree
benefits). When courts in these kinds of cases apply ton reasoning, however. reasoning which is a%ailablc
when employees bring a fiduciary duty claim against the plan admtnstrator. see infra notes 215-219 and
accompanying text, the reservation clauses are not determinative The outcome ts instead determned tn part
according to whether it was reasonable for the employees to rely on the statements notwithstanding the
reservation clauses. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe. 116 S Ct 1065. 1073 (1996)
170. Reliance might be reasonable even with certain disclaimers or cautionary statements made within
the same communication or elsewhere. The key question would be whether the disclaimers or cautions were
sufficiently influential as to make reliance unreasonable Cf Dale . Rosenfeld. 229 F2d 855, 858 (2d Ctr
1956) ("Availability elsewhere of truthful information cannot excuse untruths or misleading omtssions tn
the prospectus."); Loss, supra note 29. at 892 n 19 (recognizing the possibilit) that under section 12(2) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994). true statements in one communication would not necessarly deny
recovery if statements appearing in another communication were false).
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employer statements unenforceable in contract. The inadequate level of
protection and increased cost of this approach indicate that it is not a complete
solution.
B. The Level of Protection in Tort
Some commentators have suggested that the common law provides lesser
substantive protection against fraud than the securities laws.17 ' To the extent
this is true, the argument for statutory fraud protection in the labor market
would be strengthened. But as was outlined above, the level of protection from
fraud under the common law is quite high and is increasing.'72 Under
common law tort, complete silence does not protect a party to a business
transaction who by concealment intentionally prevents the other from acquiring
material information;1 73 any representation that creates a false impression and
thus covers up the truth is classified as misleading and is just as actionable as
a verbal assurance that the fact is not true;' 74 if a party to a transaction
communicates, she must disclose a sufficient amount to keep her words from
being misleading; t75 and "half of the truth may obviously amount to a lie, if
it is understood to be the whole."'176 These expanding protections could
possibly provide an adequate remedy.
One is unable to say with certainty, then, whether the substance of the
common law provides a noticeably lower level of fraud protection than is
available statutorily in the capital markets under the securities laws.' 77 If and
to the extent fraud protection seems stronger under the securities laws, such
apparent strength may depend simply on the fact that the securities laws in
effect federalized common law protection. The ensuing judicial broadening of
fraud protection under the securities laws might simply be the continuance of
an expansion that had been occurring, and would have continued, in the
common law.
7 8
171. See Loss, supra note 29, at 716.
172. See supra Section I.A.
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1977).
174. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 106, at 737.
175. See id. § 106, at 738.
176. Id.
177. Professor Georgakopoulos has argued that securities laws are stricter than common law deceit
because of the relaxation of the reliance element on the basis of the fraud-on-the-market theory. See
Georgakopoulos, supra note 152, at 711-19. He contends convincingly that a relaxation of the reliance
requirement makes sense in the financial markets. But there is nothing about the fraud-on-the-markct theory
that limits it to the federal securities context and excludes common law courts from using it in common
law deceit actions involving securities. In other words, the use of the frud-on-the-market theory says less
about the difference between federal and common law than about the market for securities and the market
for real goods. One can support an antifraud statute for workers and remain agnostic with regard to whether
the fraud-on-the-market theory should apply in actions brought under such a statute. For a discussion of
the fraud-on-the-market theory in the capital markets, see infra notes 282-286 and accompanying text.
178. Cf. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915 (N.Y. 1969) (recognizing a common law
proscription against insider trading and noting that "[tihere is nothing in the Federal law which indicates
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Yet one should not conclude that a federal statute for workers is
unnecessary. Indeed, fraud was illegal in every state of the union in 1933,' 79
yet Congress nevertheless felt it necessary to enact fraud protection for the
capital markets on the national level.'s0 Also, the core antifraud protection
of the securities acts continues to command broad public support, implying that
the acts offer some benefit. 81
Indeed, a national statutory rule is preferable to the common law on
several grounds even if the underlying substantive law is more or less the
same. 82 Under the common law, the legal rules will vary somewhat across
jurisdictions and will tend to vary more than they would if all courts were
interpreting a common statutory text. When rules vary across jurisdictions, it
is more difficult for companies and investors (as well as employers and
employees) to know what the law requires. Similarly, even within a
jurisdiction, a common law rule will tend to have more elasticity than a rule
based on a statute. Such elasticity in a rule will impose uncertainty costs on
those seeking to abide by it. The fact that a party often cannot know, until long
after the fact, whether she will be found to have violated the law will make the
law less efficient in deterring harmful activity and will increase the costs of
obedience. A clearer legal rule avoids these costs.' In addition, some
companies engage in business across a number of jurisdictions. It is simply
more efficient to litigate claims in one federal court than in several state
courts.' 84 These reasons apply as easily to a labor market fraud rule as they
do to a capital market fraud rule.
In fact, there are reasons to be particularly skeptical about the ability of the
common law to remedy fraud in the labor market. Ironically, aspects of federal
law throw up obstacles to employees bringing fraud claims against their
employers through possible preemption by federal labor law or ERISA. These
preemption doctrines do not apply to capital investors and impose significant
obstacles to employees' abilities to vindicate common law rights. Even when
employees are able to overcome these constraints, the common law fraud
remedy has provided, at best, limited assistance.
that it was intended to limit the power of the States to fashion additional remedies to effectuate -imilar
purposes").
179. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54. at 670
180. See Seligman, supra note 85. at 18.
181. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
182. For an analysis of whether the proper locus of statutory protection is at the state or federal lesel,
see infra Section V.B.
183. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 699.
184. See Michael J. Missal, The Affairs of State. Securities Regulatin b% States Presents Its Own
Challenges, LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1997, at S34.
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1. The Section 301 Preemption Problem
One of the largest obstacles to workers successfully using common law
tort remedies is federal labor law, specifically the labor law doctrine of section
301 preemption.' 85 Section 301 of the LMRA grants federal jurisdiction over
suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements. 86 Under section 301,
"courts determine whether the collective bargaining agreement preempts claims
an employee brings under [other statutes or the] common law."'' 87 Because
many instances of employer fraud pertain to matters-such as job security,
working conditions, or employment benefits-that collective bargaining
agreements typically cover, a section 301 preemption question is presented
whenever a unionized employee attempts to bring a fraud claim in a judicial
forum. When a claim is preempted, its preemption is complete: "[I]t is
converted into a section 301 claim from its inception, even if alternative causes
of action are pleaded in the complaint."'
' 88
This limitation is a significant obstacle to workers' attempts to vindicate
their common law rights because the Supreme Court has given section 301 a
broad preemptive scope on the ground that the law surrounding labor
agreements "is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law."'' 8 9 Moreover, even
though section 301 pertains to labor contracts, the Supreme Court has allowed
the section's broad preemptive scope to bar employees' tort claims as well. In
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,' 90 the Court held that section 301 preempted
an employee's state law tort claim in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that
the employer had harassed him because of an insurance claim he had filed.
The Court made clear that section 301 would preempt any claim that is
"substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made
between the parties in a labor contract,"' 9 ' whether pleaded in contract or
tort.' 92 Thus many courts have held that section 301 preempts workers'
185. See Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994); see also Stone, supra
note 95, at 577.
186. Section 301 states in relevant part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
187. Stone, supra note 95, at 577.
188. Id. at 598 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. I, 23-24
(1983)).
189. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919), accord Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962); see also Stone, supra note 95, at 596 (discussing
Lucas Flour).
190. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
191. Id. at 220.
192. See id. at 211.
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claims that their employers have defrauded them.'"3
Katherine Van Wezel Stone has noted two practical consequences of a
state common law claim's preemption under section 301.'4 First, "any
claims for breach of a collective bargaining agreement that are even arguably
subject to an arbitration clause must be decided in arbitration, rather than by
a court."' 95 Courts have "also adopted an extremely narrow standard for
judicial review of the arbitration decisions."'" In practice, this means that
an employee whose claim is preempted under section 301 may pursue private
arbitration only. As a result, by virtue of the combination of section 301
preemption rules and their collective bargaining agreements, unionized workers
find that they do not have access to any court to assert their state law claims.
Second, when a claim is preempted under section 301, the state law rights
are extinguished. The arbitrator applies the law of the collective agreement, not
the external state law that the employee initially sought to invoke.'9 7 The
unionized employee whose state law claim is preempted thus receives neither
the benefit of a judicial forum nor the advantage of the substantive provisions
of the state common law right.'"8
To be sure, section 301 preemption does not bar all common law fraud
claims arising in the context of the employment relation. Most basically,
section 301 pertains only to collective bargaining agreements, so any employee
unrepresented by a union would not face these problems. Even unionized
workers can avoid the preemption problem if the underlying claim does not
depend on the collective bargaining agreement but on individual oral
employment agreements.'" But, even with these exceptions, the point
193. See, e.g., Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distnb Co. 961 F2d 654. 661-62 7th Cir 1992). Smith
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 943 F.2d 764. 767-71 (7th Cir 1991). Dougherty % Amencan Tel & Tel Co.
902 F.2d 201, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1990): Terwilliger %. Greyhound Lines. Inc, 882 F2d 1033. 1040 (6th Cir
1989); Darden v. United States Steel Corp.. 830 F2d 1116. 1118-20 (lltth Cir 1987). Young ' Anthon,'s
Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993. 997-1002 (9th Cir. 1987). Stallcop v Kaiser Found Hosp-. 820 F2d
1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1987), Bale v. General Tel. Co.. 795 F2d 775. 779-80 (9th Cir 1986). Serrano
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 790 F.2d 1279. 1286-89 (6th Cir 1986)
194. See Stone, supra note 95, at 594-96.
195. Id. at 595; see also United Steelworkers %, Wamor & Gulf Nasigation Co, 363 U S 574. 5,4.85
(1960) (announcing the presumption of arbitrability); United Steelw.orkers v American Mfg Co. 363 U S
564, 567-68 (1960) (ruling on a motion to compel arbitration that the judicial role is limited to determining
whether the plaintiff has asserted "a claim which on its face is governed by the contract")
196. Stone, supra note 95, at 595: see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v Misco. Inc . 484 L' S
29, 36 (1987) ("[Clourts are not authorized to reconsider the mients of an larbitrall award eern though the
parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on mistnterpretation of itie contract ")
197. See Warrior & GulfNavigation. 363 U.S. at 581-81: Stone. supra note 95. at 595 & n 74
198. An additional difficulty posed by section 301 is that the statute of limitations is six months shile
the limitations period under state common law fraud is usually greater See. e g . CAL Ci% PROC CODE
§ 338 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (three years): 735 ILL. Cotp STAT A\', 5/13-205 (West 1')$2) (fie
years); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260. § 2A (West 1992) (three %ears). N Y C PL R 213 tConsol
1997) (six years).
199. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. \Williams. 482 U S. 386 (1987). Stone. supra note 95. at 600-01 In some
other cases, courts have held that section 301 did not preempt employees' common la.% Iraud claims See
Milne Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F2d 1401 (9th Citr 1991). Wells %. General Motors
Corp., 881 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989); Berda v. CBS Inc. 881 F2d 20 (3d Citr 1989). Vamutn '. Nu-Car
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remains that section 301 preemption is a significant problem in the vindication
of common law rights in the labor context and has no corollary in the capital
market context. The fact that nonunionized workers do not need to worry about
section 301 preemption may provide little solace because unions offer one of
the few private mechanisms to monitor fraud in the labor market. 2°°
Furthermore, the legal doctrine allowing plaintiffs to avoid section 301
preemption if their claims concern individual rather than collective matters is
hardly a bright line rule. Because the uncertainty of such a rule increases the
expected litigation costs for workers seeking to vindicate their common law
right not to be defrauded, section 301 preemption weakens the common law's
ability to protect against fraud in the labor market even in those cases in which
the employee's claim ultimately avoids preemption. 20 '
2. The ERISA Preemption Problem
Some of the most hurtful frauds occur when employers mislead employees
with regard to employment benefits such as health insurance, disability plans,
and pensions.20 2 Not only is this kind of fraud potentially devastating, but
one would also expect it to be relatively common. As David Chamy recently
pointed out, workers are not typically well-informed about particular aspects
of firms' benefit plans, 20 3 and with ill-informed employees, firms will tend
"to compete on salient aspects of jobs, like higher wages and job security,
while cutting comers on less visible features, like the details of insurance
coverage. ''204 Insurance, in particular, "becomes a particularly tempting arena
for employer opportunism because workers may discover coverage limits or
changes only after many years at the job. 20 5
A typical situation might involve an employee enticed to accept early
retirement in part with statements that she would continue to receive full
insurance coverage. Several months later, after the newly retired employee is
diagnosed with a debilitating, costly illness, she also learns that her insurance
was cut off on the date of her resignation.2° If this employee were to seek
Carriers, Inc., 804 F.2d 638 (11th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1986);
Barske v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 514 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa 1994).
200. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
201. Because section 301 is part of a federal law, a federal statute would be required to avoid these
preemption obstacles completely.
202. See Lewis, supra note 28; All Things Considered, supra note 28.
203. See David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1601. 1618
(1996).
204. Id. at 1619.
205. Id. Charny cites a General Accounting Office study that determined that over 70% of retired
workers misunderstood when they would be eligible for retirement benefits. See id. at 1619 n.48 (citing
JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 75 (1990) (citing U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PENSION PLANS: MANY WORKERS DON'T KNOW WHEN THEY CAN RETIRE
2 (1987))).
206. Cf. Pace v. Signal Tech. Corp., 628 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1994) (examining a situation in which an
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legal recourse against her employer, she would face a number of obstacles.
First, if she brought a common law fraud claim, it is likely that a court would
bar the claim as preempted by ERISA. 27 Second, the remedies available
under ERISA would be less than would have been available under the common
law. This section discusses each of these problems in turn.
ERISA is an intricate statute that establishes a federal regulatory scheme
for employee retirement plans, including both pension and benefit plans.2"
Section 514(a) preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" by any employer engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce.209 The "relate
to" preemption language has been interpreted to be "clearly expansive,"2 '
preempting any state law that "'has a connection with or ... reference to such
a plan.' '2 1 Broad preemption is necessary, it is said, to further Congress's
intent to "establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal
concern." 212 Thus, a number of courts have held that ERISA preempts
common law fraud claims that concern some aspect of a covered employment
plan.213 According to the First Circuit, for example, preemption is appropriate
when the "existence of [an employee benefit pilan is inseparably connected to
any determination of liability under state common law of
misrepresentation. '14 Preemption would also be appropriate, presumably, if
the determination of liability would require the court to inquire into the content
of the plan, rather than merely its existence.
Thus ERISA may prevent workers from taking advantage of common law
remedies that otherwise would be available to them. Whether ERISA
preemption on balance erodes protection for workers depends, however, on the
level of protection ERISA provides in the place of the common law. Here, the
employee had accepted a severance package that stretched payments o'er sit. months. %,tth the
understanding that the insurance would continue dunng the payout period. but s'hen the employee %%-as
subsequently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, the employee found out that the insurance coverage had
ceased on the final day of employment).
207. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
208. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1997).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
210. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v Dillingham Constr. N A . 117 S Ct 832. 837
(1997) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
211. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd of Trade. 506 US 125. 129 (1992))
212. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux. 481 U.S. 41. 46 (1987) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1763-65 (holding that ERISA preempts state community property
law); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S 133. 138-39 (1990) (noting that Congres chose
expansive language with regard to state law preemption).
213. See, e.g., Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697. 700 (st Cir 1994). Kelso General Am
Life Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 388, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1992): Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants. Inc.. 956 F 2d
126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992); Consolidated Beef Indus.. Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 949 F2d 960. 964 (8th
Cir. 1991); Bernatowicz v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.. 785 F. Supp. 488. 492-93 (D.NJ ), aff'd. 981 F2d 1246
(3d Cir. 1992). But see DiPietro-Kay Corp. v. Interactive Benefits Corp. 825 F Supp 459 (D Conn
1993); Sandier v. New York News Inc., 721 F. Supp. 506. 512-15 (S.D.N Y. 1989). Greenblatt v Budd
Co., 666 F Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1987): Pace v. Signal Tech Corp.. 628 N.E 2d 20 (Mass- 1994)
214. Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 700.
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answer is that ERISA provides some, but less, protection against employer
fraud than the common law would.
Recently, in Varity Corp. v. Howe, t 5 the Supreme Court authorized
ERISA suits brought by individual workers against employers who had
intentionally misled them regarding the security of their benefits. In Varity, the
defendant company created a separately incorporated subsidiary into which it
could place a number of the parent company's outstanding debts and
commitments. The plan was to allow the subsidiary to fail and go into
bankruptcy, eliminating the obligations. Among the obligations the parent
company sought to eliminate were those arising from the benefit plan's
promises to pay certain medical and other nonpension benefits to employees.
The parent enticed about 1500 employees to move to the new subsidiary with
various representations that their benefits would remain secure if they
voluntarily transferred to the subsidiary. These representations were lies, as the
parent company knew that the subsidiary was bound to fail.216 The subsidiary
indeed collapsed after two years, and the employees lost their nonpension
benefits.
Though ERISA does not have a specific provision making material
misrepresentations actionable, the Court held that the employer's deliberate
misrepresentations violated the fiduciary obligations ERISA imposes upon plan
administrators. ERISA provides that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries, and the Court decided that "deceiving a plan's beneficiaries
in order to save the employer money at the beneficiaries' expense" violated
this requirement.218 Varity may thus supply a meaningful and important
remedy for employees who have been defrauded by their employers, and it
should be applauded.1 9
But whatever protection Varity offers, important and significant gaps still
exist. First, Varity protects employees only from employer fraud that is related
to employee pensions and benefits. It does not protect against fraud relating to
wages, job security, working conditions, promotion policies, or the like. The
presence of fraud protection under ERISA highlights its absence elsewhere.
Second, even if the employee does win a fiduciary duty claim under ERISA,
only equitable relief, as opposed to damages, is available. 20 In a number of
215. 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
216. See id. at 1068-69.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
218. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074.
219. Since the Court decided Varity, employees have indeed been able to use ERISA fiduciary duties
to win victories in fraud cases in lower courts. See, e.g., Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117 (2d
Cir. 1997) (vacating the district court's judgment against employees who brought a fiduciary duty claim);
Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 92 F.3d 1425 (6th Cir. 1996) (reinstating a fiduciary duty claim).
220. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1994), aff'd,
116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
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cases, therefore, a defrauded employee will be able to recover significantly less
under ERISA than would be available under the common law, which allows
for compensatory damages for deceit.22 '
Third, Varity protects employees from employer fraud only if the employer
is acting as the plan administrator when the misrepresentations occur. The duty
to avoid misrepresentations arises because of the employer's fiduciary duties
under ERISA. The employer is a fiduciary "'to the extent' that he or she
'exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management' of the plan, or 'has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration' of the plan."222 The Court found that the
misrepresentations at issue in Varit" were related to plan administration
because Varity was "both an employer and the benefit plan's
administrator. ' 223 In addition, statements about the company's financial
health were, according to the Court, "intentionally connected" to statements
about the future of employees' benefits,224 the statements were made by
"those within the firm who had authority to communicate as fiduciaries,"2''
and reasonable employees could have believed that the company was making
the statements in its "capacity as plan administrator."2 26 It is hardly clear
whether, and how, these criteria will be applied in future cases. Indeed, the
Court went out of its way to limit the scope of its holding:
We conclude ... that the factual context in which the statements were
made, combined with the plan-related nature of the activity, engaged
in by those who had plan-related authority to do so, together provide
sufficient support for the District Court's legal conclusion that Varity
was acting as a fiduciary.
In an ironic way, then, Varity underscores the default rule that an employer
qua employer does not owe any duty under federal law to avoid deceiving its
employees. The defendant in Varit' had chosen to administer its own plan;
such a choice is hardly required. 2 8 Perhaps an employer could avoid the
Varity duties simply by choosing some other entity, a professional plan
administrator for example, to administer its employee benefit plan. If the
employer thereafter deceived its employees about employee benefits, the
221. Cf., e.g., Howe, 36 F.3d at 756-57 (vacating a jury award of S7 6 million in compensatory
damages to one group of plaintiffs and substituting equitable relief of less than S700.000. reinstatement into
the plan, and restitution for accrued benefits).
222. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1071 (quoting 29 USC. § 1002(21)(a))
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1074.
225. Id. at 1073.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1994); VaritY. 116 S. Ct at 1071 (noting that the defendant %&as both
employer and plan administrator, as ERISA "permits"): id. at 1084 (Thomas. J.. dissenting) ("Under ERISA.
an employer is permitted to act both as plan sponsor and plan administrator")
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employees could be left completely without a remedy; ERISA would preempt
the common law claim and fail to provide an alternative."'
One final irony is worth noting. Varity provides a limited remedy for
employees who are defrauded by their employers about ERISA-covered
benefits if the employer breaches its fiduciary duties as plan administrator
when making affirmative misrepresentations. Yet, under the common law as
well as under the federal securities laws, it is unlawful to make material
misrepresentations even to those to whom one does not owe a fiduciary
duty.23 For workers to receive analogous protection from affirmatively
deceptive statements, the Court needed to find that the employer was breaching
a fiduciary duty that would be unrequired in these other contexts. Absent a
fiduciary duty, workers can be left without a remedy for affirmative
misstatements, while for other market participants, the existence of fiduciary
duty is immaterial.
3. The Apparent Presumption Against Workers Using Tort Law
To Protect Themselves from Fraud
Because of these obstacles, it is reasonable to assume that workers' fraud
claims reach the merits less often than analogous fraud claims brought by other
market participants. If this assumption is true, it would help belie the notion
that the common law provides an adequate substitute to federal fraud
protection for workers. The questions of whether the common law could
provide adequate protection, if the preemption problems outlined above were
somehow solved, demands a closer look at the relatively few cases that do
reach the merits.23' Admittedly, the relative scarcity of cases makes it
difficult to argue conclusively either way. One can, however, examine cases
that have reached the merits and evaluate whether they are consistent with the
view that the common law protects workers adequately from fraud.
For workers seeking to depend on the common law, the cases available for
analysis are not particularly encouraging. The cases suggest the following as
229. Cf. Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1992). In Pohl, the
defendant, the employer's health benefits provider, told Mrs. Pohl that her husband's benefit plan would
cover 80% of the costs of treating their daughter's psychiatric illness. In fact, the plan limited payment to
$10,000. The daughter underwent treatment, and the Pohls were billed a total of $19,000. Thcy
subsequently brought a misrepresentation claim. The district court preempted the common law claim. In
an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the plan administrator's function
under the plan was ministerial only, rather than discretionary. The administrator was therefore not a
fiduciary. The Pohls were left "remediless." Id. at 127. Judge Posner emphasized that preemption was
required by the statute even though "ERISA does not provide a substitute remedy." Id. at 128.
230. See supra notes 29-30, 43-51 and accompanying text.
231. Even if common law courts dealt fairly with workers' claims, the proponent of a common-law-
only regime would still have to demonstrate that a state remedy is better than a federal one. As noted
below, see infra Section V.B, drawbacks to this approach include possibly lower protection under the




a working hypothesis: Some courts apply what amounts to a presumption
against using the common law to aid workers allegedly defrauded by their
employers. Misrepresentations that would appear to be sufficient to support a
fraud claim in other contexts are held to be insufficient in the employment
context. To illustrate this hypothesis, one case in particular deserves careful
attention.
a. White v. National Steel Corp.
Consider White v. National Steel Corp.232 Steel workers whose job
security was protected by a collective bargaining agreement accepted
"management" positions not covered by the bargaining agreement after
National Steel allegedly made promises of job security for the new positions.
These promises included the right to return to their former positions if they so
wished. When the workers were nevertheless laid off, they brought suit for
breach of contract and fraud. 33 The claims of fraud were based on the
allegation that National Steel actively misrepresented its policies and conditions
of employment for management positions. The employees also brought a claim
of "constructive" fraud, allowed under West Virginia law, arguing that
National had an affirmative duty to disclose certain material facts that affected
the employees' jobs.
This case is worth focussing on for several reasons. First, the situation
presented in the case contained the very kind of fraud at issue in this Article,
fraud which would almost certainly be covered by any federal antifraud statute
for workers. The alleged misrepresentations and omissions pertained to
conditions or terms of employment, and they were sufficiently important to be
material. Second, the case arose in a jurisdiction that appears to offer more
than enough protection against fraud. Not only do West Virginia courts
recognize suits for affirmative misrepresentations, they also provide'through
the doctrine of constructive fraud a way for courts to punish material
omissions. Third, the case was litigated in federal court, and the appellate
decision was written by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, a well-respected
conservative jurist on the Fourth Circuit. Fourth, the court was considering the
defendant's motion for summary judgment,231 thus requiring it to rule for the
plaintiffs if there was a genuine issue of material fact. One might reasonably
suppose that if the employee plaintiffs could find a fair hearing in this case,
232. 938 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1991).
233. See id. at 488-90. The suit was originally filed in state court in \vest Virginia but was
subsequently removed to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (e) (1994). presumably because
of the federal questions arising under the section 301 preemption doctrine. See white v National Steel
Corp., 742 F. Supp. 312, 318 n.4 (N.D. W. Va. 1989), aff'd. 938 F2d 474 (4th Cir. 1991). cf Berda v
CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 21 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining removal to federal court when federal law
preempts a state cause of action).
234. See White, 938 F.2d at 489.
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gaps in fraud protection for workers could be filled through state tort law
rather than a federal statute. Conversely, if the common law did not provide
adequate protection against fraud in the workplace in this case, there is further
reason to believe that a statute would be necessary to provide real fraud
protection to workers.
An analysis of the case provides evidence for the latter proposition. Judge
Wilkinson's opinion made quick work of the employees' fraud allegations and
upheld a grant of summary judgment to the defendant employer on those
claims. 2 35 The way the court rejected these claims illustrates the apparent
presumption against workers' common law fraud claims.
i. Constructive Fraud
The court disposed of the constructive fraud claim in just four paragraphs.
In West Virginia, courts allow constructive fraud claims to be brought on the
basis of a failure to disclose, rather than an affirmative misstatement. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had defined constructive fraud as "a breach
of a legal or equitable duty, which, irrespective of moral guilt of the fraud
feasor, the law declares fraudulent, because of its tendency to deceive others,
to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public interests."23 6 This
definition does not require the plaintiff to show a breach of a preexisting duty.
Indeed, the "duty" can be the result of the court's decision to require some
kind of disclosure rather than its basis.237
In White, the employee plaintiffs alleged that National Steel had committed
constructive fraud when it enticed them to accept managerial positions but
failed to inform them of certain company policies. National Steel had often
promoted hourly rate employees to management positions at times of increased
business when it needed more foremen and managers.238 The company's
practice was to return the workers, when business declined, to their former
positions with their accumulated seniority restored. 239 This time, however,
the company laid off the plaintiffs from their management positions and
refused to return them to their hourly jobs. National Steel asserted that its
practice of returning recently promoted employees to their union jobs was a
235. The court reached the merits after deciding that the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by
section 301 or by other aspects of federal labor law because the claims were based on individual
employment contracts and were "independent of any collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 482.
236. Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679, 683 (W. Va. 1981), quoted in White, 938 F.2d at
489.
237. See Stanley, 285 S.E.2d at 683 ("The law indulges in an assumption of fraud for the protection
of valuable social interests based upon an enforced concept of confidence, both public and private.").
238. See White, 938 F.2d at 478.
239. See White v. National Steel Corp., 742 F. Supp. 312, 339 n.31 (N.D. W. Va. 1989) ("In fact,
there does not appear to be any evidence in the voluminous record before this Court of any former
bargaining unit member who was not permitted to return prior to the layoffs giving rise to the claims in
this litigation."), aff'd, 938 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1991).
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matter of discretion, and the plaintiffs claimed that the company had
committed constructive fraud by failing to inform them that the practice could
be discontinued. In addition, the employees based a constructive fraud
claim on an allegation that, after they had been promoted to positions without
seniority, the company entered into a collective bargaining agreement
prohibiting their return to their old jobs. 24' The employees alleged that it was
constructive fraud when the company failed to inform them of such a change
in policy.24
2
Faced with these claims, both the district court and the Fourth Circuit
declined to use the common law power West Virginia law gave them to hold
National Steel liable for constructive fraud. The court of appeals upheld the
district court's grant of summary judgment for National Steel on all of the
employees' constructive fraud claims. It would have been one thing, and much
more defensible, if the court had held that the facts of the case would not
support a finding of constructive fraud. But the court went further, refusing
even to apply the law of constructive fraud to the facts.
According to the Fourth Circuit, constructive fraud law does not apply to
the employment relationship. The court's reasoning was made in three cursory
steps. First, the court found unpersuasive the precedents brought to bear by the
employees because "[t]he cases they cite[d] establish claims for constructive
fraud in the context of property sales."24 3 Second, the court said that
240. See White, 938 F.2d at 479.
241. See id. at 480.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 489. It could be argued that this reasoning reseals a presumption against using fraud law
to assist workers. The court apparently beieved that the employment context is sufficientl, different from
property sales that the precedents developed in the latter are not persuasive in the former This is hardly
self-evident, as courts for decades have used property imagery to help make judgments with regard to
employment law and the relationship between laborers and thetr employees. See. e g. State v Goodwill.
33 W. Va. 179, 183 (1889) (striking down a labor law on due process grounds, saying a man's labor was
his "most sacred" property); cf Richard A. Epstein. The Mistakes of 1937. GEo. MAsoN U L REV . Winter
1988, at 5, 19 ("At common law, all workers owned their labor and employers owned their capital ")
Although many of the older cases making such an analogy have been overruled. see, e g . Adkins v
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). overrtded by West Coast Hotel Co s, Parrish. 300 U S 379 (1937)
(upholding a minimum wage law for women), it rematns true that property doctrine is often used to
interpret and analyze the employment relation. For example, scholars have argued pow erfully that property
law is a helpful metaphor for explaining and categorizing certain problems that arise wi ithin the employment
relation. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 4. passim. The Supreme Court. too. has recognized the powerful
similarities between jobs and other kinds of property. See. e.g.. Perry v Sindermann. 408 U S 593. 601-02
(1972) (stating that a junior college teacher might have a property interest in continued employment under
his school's informal tenure system).
One can disagree, of course, with specific holdings in cases and specific analyses in law journals and
still accept the point that the analogy between property and employment can be a close one The White
court, however, thought the differences between property and employment were so great that it was
unnecessary to explain why constructive fraud precedents arising out of property sales w*ere not persuasi'c
when used in the employment context. The court simply stated that the cases cited by the planmtiffs came
from the context of property sales. See White, 938 F.2d at 489 In effect, the court was saying that when
negotiating the conditions of a stock purchase (which. the court assumed. involves the sale of "'property").
it is important that the parties not deceive each other, and fraud law will protect against such deception
When negotiating the conditions of employment. however, each party will have to assume the risk that the
other is deceiving her. And, the court must have concluded, the situations are so different that the
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constructive fraud "is generally reserved for those cases where a fiduciary
relationship exists between the parties or the fraud violates an important public
policy concern."'2" Finally, the court concluded that to recognize constructive
fraud in this situation would conflict with West Virginia's doctrine of at will
employment.2 45 Each of these reasons is open to criticism, but the last is the
one that best highlights the apparent presumption against using fraud law to
benefit workers.
In stating its justification for refusing to extend the protection of
constructive fraud law to employees, the court drew on images of judicial
deference: "[A]ny court-imposed affirmative duty to inform employees of
conditions of employment, particularly layoff policies and criteria, may lead
to diminution of West Virginia's at will doctrine. 246 The court reasoned that
a duty to disclose such policies would leave employers with a Hobson's
choice: not to disclose and be held accountable for constructive fraud or to
disclose and then be bound by their representations in contract. This rationale
provided sufficient reason for the court to refuse to import constructive fraud
law into labor and employment law.247
differences need not be explained.
244. White, 938 F.2d at 489-90 (citing Miller v. Huntington & Ohio Bridge Co., 15 S.E.2d 687, 695
(W. Va. 1941)). This reasoning is similarly open to attack. The court was correct to note that affirmative
duties to disclose information arise most often in situations in which there is a fiduciary relationship
between the parties, a relationship that did not exist in this case. But there are numerous exceptions, and
the exceptions are growing. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. Some of the cases cited by the
court, in fact, involved factual circumstances in which the doctrine of constructive fraud was recognized
even without the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Chamberlaine & Flowers, Inc. v. McBee,
356 S.E.2d. 626 (W. Va. 1987) (holding that a vendor has a duty to disclose substantial defects in housing
to potential purchasers); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that a builder-vendor
has a duty to disclose to potential purchasers substantial defects in housing that would not be revealed by
a reasonably diligent inspection).
The court did recognize that the absence of preexisting fiduciary duty does not end the inquiry. If
"public policy" would be served, the doctrine of constructive fraud could be applied even without a
fiduciary duty. But if the absence of fiduciary duty does not end the analysis, then the question becomes
much more difficult than the court admitted. The key question the court had to resolve in analyzing the
employees' constructive fraud claim was not whether there existed a fiduciary relationship between the
employees and employer. Instead, the pivotal inquiry should have been whether an exception to that
principle should be recognized in this case as it had been elsewhere. The court could have looked at the
range of cases in which exceptions had been recognized and then determined in what ways they were
similar to the case at hand, or the court might have taken its own language seriously and analyzed whether
"important public policy concerns" were at stake. But the court hardly nodded toward either inquiry.
To be sure, the court did look beyond the fiduciary duty doctrine in one sense. It noted that the facts
did not "show behavior so arbitrary and irresponsible as to be egregious," White, 938 F.2d at 490, an
unsympathetic test that all but sealed the fate of the employees' claim. A basic problem with the court's
use of this test was that it was derived not from the law of West Virginia but from that of Maine. See id.
(citing Broussard v. CACI, Inc.-Federal, 780 F.2d 162, 164 (lst Cir. 1986) (citing Larrabee v. Penobscot
Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97, 99-100 (Me. 1984); Terrio v. Millincocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135,
137 (Me. 1977))). Instead of looking at the doctrine's exceptions or analyzing public policy concerns, as
the law of West Virginia would seem to have dictated, the court borrowed from a First Circuit case.
245. White, 938 F.2d at 490.
246. Id.
247. See id. ("We see no indication that West Virginia would have us adopt a legal doctrine developed
in the context of commercial sales and apply it within employment relationships.").
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This rationale is unsatisfactory. Even if a tension between at will
employment and fraud existed, it is not obvious (at least without a much more
detailed argument) why the judicially created doctrine of at will employment
should trump the judicially created doctrine of constructive fraud. But the
tension is, in any event, less than the court proposed. "Employees could easily
argue," the White court explained, that "disclosure of employment policies
gives rise to binding oral contracts '248 requiring the employers to abide by
the terms of those policies. The recognition of such rights would weaken the
at will doctrine, and the court saw "no indication" that the West Virginia
courts would accept such a weakening.249 But certainly the White court could
be charged with the recognition that an employee's contract arguments are not
unquestionably accepted by courts, even when made "easily." Instead, the court
should have assumed that West Virginia courts would accept the employees'
arguments that disclosures amounted to contracts only when the disclosures
were stated in promissory terms. In such cases, there is no tension between the
fraud and at will doctrines because, when there is a promise of continued
employment, the at will doctrine is, and should be, set aside. The tension, if
it exists at all, arises in determining whether a statement is a promise, not in
deciding whether the statement should be disclosed.
Moreover, even if the tension were to exist in theory, it would rarely exist
in practice. The statements that employers would need to make to avoid
committing constructive fraud are the kind that would make employment
policies seem less like a contract. In the White case itself, for example, the
employees were arguing that the company should have said something like: "It
is up to the company, not the employees, to decide which employees are able
to go back to their old jobs." This is not the kind of statement that the
employees would likely want to argue was a part of their contract. Indeed, the
kind of statement that the employer typically keeps secret is something like,
"I can lay you off for any reason or for no reason at all." The disclosure of
such a statement would seem to bolster, rather than undermine, the at will
doctrine. Contrary to the White court's insinuation, the reason for not
disclosing such a statement has nothing to do with the desire to preserve the
at will doctrine but is an attempt to maintain the illusion of offering secure
employment without actually having to do so."
Instead of leaving the employers with a Hobson's choice, the court's
logical error grants them the benefits of two legal rules. They can make
representations that look like contracts, but because of employment at will they
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text (noting that absent a fraud law employers will
have economic incentives to mislead employees to believe their jobs are more secure than they are. in order
to entice workers to develop firm-specific skills).
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are not forced to offer full disclosure, which would ensure that their statements
were not misleading.2
ii. Actual Fraud
The Fourth Circuit's rejection of the employee plaintiffs' claims of actual
fraud also illustrates the apparent presumption operating against workers' fraud
claims in common law courts. The plaintiffs' complaint had included two
counts of actual fraud. In the first count, the employees alleged that National
Steel had told them that they had the right to return to their former positions
when they chose to do so. Statements to this effect were false when made,
alleged the plaintiffs, because National Steel's actual policy was that the
company, rather than the employees, decided who could return.252 In the
second count, the plaintiffs asserted that the company had made three false
promises: (1) that it would transfer rather than lay off the new management
employees who were no longer governed by a collective bargaining agreement;
(2) that there would be no layoffs of these management employees; and (3)
that layoffs would be based on company seniority rather than tenure in a
specific position or job category.5 3
According to the court, the employees' first count for actual fraud-that
the company had misrepresented to the employees that they had the right to
return to their union jobs-was flawed in several ways. The "primary problem"
was the "generality and vagueness" of the alleged misrepresentations,
254
which made it impossible for the plaintiffs to prove fraud by the required
"'clear and distinct evidence.' 255 The court made it difficult to evaluate its
holding in this regard because it did not describe the actual representations that
appeared in the record. 6 Whatever the actual statements had been, the court
said that they should not go to the jury because the representations were as
consistent with truthfulness as they were with falsity, and "fraud 'is not
deducible from facts and circumstances which would be equally consistent with
honest intentions.' ' 257
251. The district court in White fell into the same logical trap. The district court stated, "It would
appear that, in an 'at will' state, a holding that the employer had an affirmative duty to disclose to
prospective at will employees terms and conditions under which the employee was to be laid off, would
deprive the employer of his 'at will' rights." White v. National Steel Corp., 742 F. Supp. 312, 337 (N.D.
W. Va. 1989), aff'd, 938 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1991). The only way the court's statement would be true.
however, is if what the employer had failed to disclose was indeed some limit on the employer's ability
to lay off the employee. And if there is indeed some limitation on termination, the employment relation
is not in fact at will.
252. See White, 938 F.2d at 490.
253. See id. at 491.
254. Id. at 490.
255. Id. (quoting Steele v. Steele, 295 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 (S.D. W. Va. 1969)).
256. But see White, 742 R Supp. at 339 ("Usually the questions [asked by the employees) were
general (e.g., could I go back if I didn't like the job?).").
257. White, 938 F2d at 491 (quoting Steele, 295 F. Supp. at 1269).
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That fraud should be proved by clear evidence, and that the plaintiffs
should lose if the evidence is in equipoise, appear to have been straightforward
applications of West Virginia law.25 What seems less straightforward is the
court's use of these principles in the case at hand. According to the court, to
satisfy the fraud standard the plaintiffs would have had to have shown that
"National represented to them that they had the unilateral right to return to
their former positions when, in fact, National at that time reserved that power
for itself." 9 While the court did not apply this standard to the company's
alleged statements, the court implied that the statements were akin to an
exchange that the court specifically said would not satisfy this standard.
According to the court, even if before taking the management position the
employee had asked, "Can I return if I don't like the job?", and even if the
company had agreed, the employee's fraud claim still would be insufficient to
go to a jury. Such an answer to the employee's question "is much more in the
nature of a promise to return a worker than it is a misrepresentation of which
party has the final authority over the decision."2 6 Such a representation was
insufficient to constitute fraud because the company "might well have intended
to return plaintiffs [to their previous jobs] upon an expression of displeasure
but later changed its mind."26' Such a broken promise would be the
"substance of contract law" and should not be "shoehorned" into an "ill-fitting"
fraud suit.
2 62
Note how this description of the law of fraud held the employee plaintiffs
in White to a much higher standard than most other plaintiffs bringing fraud
claims. First, the court's dependence on some putatively clear line between
contract and tort was simply wrong. If a party has been fraudulently induced
to enter into a contract, she need not depend for redress on contract remedies
alone but could look to the tort doctrine of promissory fraud. -'
Second, the court's focus on the question of authority is obfuscatory.
Imagine a person trying to decide between buying an IBM computer and an
Apple computer. He asks the IBM salesperson, "Can I return the IBI if I
don't like it or if it does not work?", and the seller answers, "Yes." The buyer
purchases the IBM on the basis of this representation. It breaks. The purchaser
attempts to return the IBM the next day. The seller says, "When I said you
could return the IBM if you did not like it, I did not mean to imply that I was
258. See Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.. 848 F2d 50. 52 (4th Cir 1988). Allcghcn, De, Corp
v. Barati, 273 S.E.2d 384, 387-88 (W. Va. 1980).
259. White, 938 F.2d at 490.
260. Id. at 490-91.
261. Id. at 491.
262. Id.
263. See Janssen v. Caroline Lumber Co.. 73 S E 2d 12. 17 (W %a 1952), Dskc % Alleman. 44
S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1947); see also RESTATE.ENT (SECOND) O: TORTs § 530 t1977) The Whate court
appeared to admit as much later in the opinion. See 938 F2d at 491 (stating that the plaintiffs could state
a claim for fraud if National was simultaneously making specific plans to la) off the %c)r cmploycc, it %%as
promising not to lay off).
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giving up my authority to reject its return if I so chose. I was not representing
to you my return policy; I was making a promise. Since yesterday, I have
changed my mind. You cannot return the IBM. To the extent you have a claim
against me, it is in contract, not fraud."
In this commercial context, the seller of the IBM seems obtuse because no
reasonable person who answered "yes" to the buyer's question could believe
that it would actually make a difference to the buyer whether "yes" constituted
a false statement of the return policy or a false promise to accept the computer
if returned. To the buyer, the question of authority is immaterial if the result
under either interpretation is that the buyer can return the IBM if it does not
work. There is little doubt that such an exchange could satisfy the elements of
common law fraud because the significance attached to words is determined
according to their effect on the ordinary mind; the speaker is held responsible
if a false meaning is accepted by the hearer and the defendant knows that the
hearer has accepted it as true.26
Thus there should have been little difficulty allowing the workers to reach
the jury with their analogous claims. The key question was not whether the
company waived its rights to reassign its employees but what reasonable
employees would have understood the representations to mean. Like the
computer buyer who cared little as to whether the seller's representations
constituted a statement of policy or a promise, the employees probably cared
little about questions of authority. What was important was whether they could
rely on the company's representation that they could return to their old jobs.
This should have been an opportunity for straightforward application of
common law fraud doctrines, but the court refused.
The court was also quick to deny the plaintiffs' second count of actual
fraud-that the company had made three false promises-relying on what
appears to be two separate rationales. First, the court repeated its reasoning
from the first count of actual fraud, asserting that the misrepresentations at
issue were promises and "therefore not actionable as fraud." '65 The court
went on, however, seemingly to contradict itself by admitting that fraud could
be shown if the promises were false when made.26 But the contradiction in
theory was no problem in practice because the court drastically constrained the
type of evidence it would admit to prove the fraud. To prove the allegation
that the company committed fraud in promising that there would be "no
layoffs" of management employees, the court said that it would accept only
evidence showing that the company was "simultaneously making specific plans
to lay off the very employees it was promising not to layoff. 2 67 The
evidence that the employees did produce, that the company had indeed begun
264. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.





developing guidelines for layoffs among managerial employees, was deemed
insufficient as a matter of law.2 68 Why evidence that the company was
planning for layoffs was not relevant in proving the falsity of statements
disavowing layoffs is unclear. In any event, such evidentiary parsimoniousness
was a creation of the court rather than a reflection of the underlying doctrine.
With its second rationale the court added irony to injury. Apparently
relying on the common law requirement that reliance on misrepresentations
must be reasonable,269 the court observed that "'the turmoil in the United
States steel industry was widely known in the late 1970s and general
preparations in those years for the possibility of layoffs should hardly have
come as a surprise to employees at a steel plant. ' '2 " Given the instability of
the industry, according to the court, the employees should have expected
layoffs and should not have relied on representations to the contrary. Unable
even to begin to view the situation from the standpoint of the plaintiffs, the
court missed the point. The turmoil in the industry was the very reason that the
workers needed to depend on their employer's representations of job security,
not to mention a reason that National Steel might have had perverse incentives
to lie. Under the court's rationale, the common law should become less
powerful whenever truthfulness and completeness become more important but
less likely.
b. Grounds for Hope in the Common Law?
What can one say, then, about the prospects of using the common law to
provide workers an adequate substitute for statutory fraud protection? To be
sure, White is only one case, and without a comprehensive survey of other like
cases it is difficult to know for certain whether White is typical of a broader
tendency of courts to apply what amounts to a presumption against the use of
the common law tort of deceit to assist employees defrauded by their
employers. The cases are not empty of victories for workers,2 ' t but on
268. See id.
269. See supra note 30.
270. White, 938 F.2d at 491 (quoting White v. National Steel Corp.. 742 F Supp 312. 341 (N D W
Va. 1989), aff'd, 938 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1991)).
271. Perhaps one case that provides grounds for worker optimism is LaZar &- Siipenor Court. 909 P2d
981 (Cal. 1996). In Lazar. the Supreme Court of California allowed an employee plaintiff to state a suit
in tort for the fraudulent inducement of an employment contract. Lazar had moved to Los Angeles from
New York to accept a job after his new employer made assurances of job security He ", as subs equently
terminated. The court declined to "'exempt[] employers from ordinary fraud rules that apply to Califomam
generally." Id. at 989. Lazar is less beneficial to workers than it might at first appear. hosever While it
reaffirmed the availability of tort remedies to workers, the California Supreme Court heard it because it had
previously weakened tort protection for workers. See Hunter v Up-Right. Inc. 864 P2d 88 (Cal 1993)
(holding that employees may not recover in tort for fraud and deceit used by an employer to bnng about
the employee's resignation); see also Lazar. 909 P.2d at 992 (Mosk. J . concurrng) (explaining ho, Hunter
limited employees' tort remedies). Thus, while Lazar should be applauded, it is probably best seen as a
rear-guard action.
Employees also emerged victorious in a handful of other cases. See. e g . Tolbert v United Ins Co
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balance the cases do not appear to offer much encouragement. 272
It is worth considering the possibility that the comparative dearth of
common law fraud cases is caused neither by the preemption problems outlined
above nor some other failure of the legal system, but by the failure of
employee plaintiffs to rely on fraud law as a source of redress. Recall the
of Am., 853 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (finding that at will employees can bring fraud claims
if they involve matters collateral to the employees' status); Abdulrahim v. Gene B. Glick Co., 612 F. Supp.
256, 264 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (applying Indiana law to find that an employee negligent misrepresentation claim
survives a motion to dismiss); Telesphere Int'l, Inc. v. Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(allowing employees to go to the jury on a fraudulent concealment claim); Verway v. Blincoc Packing Co..
698 P.2d 377 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (upholding a jury verdict in favor of employees in a fraud action);
Johnson v. George J. Ball, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1355 (III. App. Ct. 1993) (reversing the trial court's dismissal
of an employee fraud claim); Wildes v. Pens Unlimited Co., 389 A.2d 837 (Me. 1978) (upholding a jury
verdict in favor of an employee in a fraud action); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Sunas, 437 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that the at will doctrine does not bar an employee fraud claim based on promissory
representation); Elizaga v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., 487 P.2d 870 (Or. 1971) (finding fraud in the
inducement of an employment contract); Elliott v. Shore Stop, Inc., 384 S.E.2d 752 (Va. 1989) (reversing
the trial court's dismissal of an employee fraud claim).
272. Consider Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993) (per curiam). There, General Motors won a series of tax abatements for its Willow Run factory
from the city of Ypsilanti. General Motors' plant manager had stated to the city that, "'Upon completion
of this project and favorable market demand, [the abatement] will allow Willow Run to continue production
and maintain continuous employment for our employees."' Id. at 558. After the corporation subsequently
announced that it would be shutting down the plant, the city sued General Motors alleging, inter alia,
promissory estoppel and misrepresentation. The trial court found for the city and enjoined the company
from closing the plant, see Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK,
1993 WL 132385 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), but the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the
company's statement was "puffery," General Motors, 506 N.W.2d at 560, and "hyperbole," id. at 561. that
the city should have expected. In the securities context, meanwhile, "the 'puffing' concept ... has all but
gone the way of the dodo." Loss, supra note 29, at 717.
Numerous other decisions have come down against employees. See, e.g., Marsh v. Coleman Co., 774
F. Supp. 608, 610-11, 613-14 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding that an employee could not reasonably rely on an
employer's statements that "there will always be a place" for the employee, that "everything's going to be
all right," and that he should "relax [and not] worry"); Hindley v. Seltel, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1093, 1094-96
(N.D. III. 1987) (applying Illinois law to find that employer representations that an employee would
participate in upcoming management discussions and would be "rewarded" when the company's financial
situation improved were insufficiently explicit to support a fraud claim); Rice v. Rent-a-Ctr. of Am., 664
F. Supp. 423, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that, under Indiana law, an employer's statement that an
employee would probably receive his position back after a short time would not support a fraud claim);
Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 1050, 1053-54 (Ala. 1990) (finding that, when an employee who had
been told that she did not have to perform a certain act was then terminated for failing to perform that act,
no actionable injury supported a fraud claim because the employee was employed at will); Merrill v.
Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 100 (Del. 1992) (holding that a contract between an employer and an
employee, stating that employment was at will, barred the employee's fraud claim based on the employer's
assurances that the employee's position was "permanent"); Ikemiya v. Shibamoto Am., Inc., 444 S.E.2d
351, 352-53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (finding a claim that an employer acted fraudulently in enticing an
employee to enter an employment contract was not supportable because the underlying employment contract
was at will); Wheeling v. Ring Radio Co., 444 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Romack v. Public
Serv. Co., 499 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that departure from another job did not
constitute a sufficiently concrete detriment to support a constructive fraud claim); Bower v. Atlis Sys. Inc.,
582 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that, because a prospective employee would have been
at will if hired, she could not have reasonably relied on assurances of prospective employment by the
defendant); Brumbach v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 510 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (App. Div. 1987) (holding
that the defendant's alleged misrepresentation that an employee professor's position was tenure-tracked was
a representation of a possible future contingency and therefore insufficient to support a fraud claim); Grant
v. DCA Food Indus., 508 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (App. Div. 1986) (finding that an employer's assurances of
"secure" employment if the plaintiff relocated could not support a fraud claim because a failure to perform
future acts is actionable only in contract and the employee was at will).
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Youngstown Steel case, in which the employee plaintiffs raised claims in
contract and promissory estoppel and fashioned a property claim out of the
workers' reliance interests.273 The plaintiffs' lawyers were among the best
in the business. 4 Yet they failed to raise a fraud claim even though much
of the employees' other claims depended squarely on interpretations of
company statements. There is a hole in the case where a fraud claim should
have been.275
Again, this is only one example. The plaintiffs' attorneys in the
Youngstown case may have had excellent reasons for not claiming fraud, "
and there is a significant likelihood that the union plaintiff would have had
section 301 preemption problems if the same situation were to arise again.2"
But the absence of a fraud claim in such a case provides support for remaining
uncertain about why common law fraud actions rarely reach the merits.
Perhaps if more actions were brought, courts would begin to learn how to deal
with them carefully and well. One of the benefits of the common law is indeed
such a facility to change and adjust to new factual situations. Perhaps, over
time, courts could indeed provide effective protection against employer
misrepresentation.
It is worth hoping for this progress within the common law, and it is
essential that it be applauded if and when it occurs. But even assuming that
courts will begin to apply fraud law as rigorously in the labor market as they
do elsewhere, the common law is bound to be inferior to federal statutory
protection. The preemption problems would remain, as would the other costs
of depending on a state-based, elastic, and variably applied web of legal
rules.278
273. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
274. For a first-person account of the fight against the Youngston closings from the perspettsc o
the unions' lead attorney, see LYND, supra note 5.
275. In fact, the genesis of this Article was a seminar discussion at Boston College Ljs School %% here
participants noticed and discussed the absence of a fraud claim in the Youngstossn case
276. Perhaps the attorneys believed that the promissory estoppel claim did the %ork of the fraud claim
The promissory estoppel claim is akin to a fraud claim. the% are not. hosseser identical tmins A fraud
claim would not have required the showing of a promise. and the companys changing definiion, ot
"profitability" would have bolstered a fraud claim even though tt doomed the promissor e toppel claim
Cf supra note 32 (noting that a fraud claim does not require the existence of a contract) Concern about
remedy might also have provided a reason for relying on promissor) estoppel rather than fraud According
to Daniel Farber and John Matheson, courts have tended to offer expectation. rather than reliance. damage
in promissory estoppel cases. See Farber & Matheson. supra note 24. at 909.10 In the Youngstossn cas.
expectation damages would presumably have been higher than reliance damages The difcrence stould not
explain, however, why the plaintiffs failed to raise a fraud claim in time allematise
277. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S 202 (1985). the case that expanded the Xection 301
preemption doctrine to bar tort claims, was decided in 1985. seseral %ears after the Youngstossn plant
closings. So even if the Youngstown plaintiffs had been successful %tith a tort claim in 1980. it is hardl,
clear that they would be successful today.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 182-184 This elaticit% %%ould be espcciall% troubling % ts-a-
vis the labor market, since ""uniform law"' is "pecuharl -" of interest %%hen it conies to labor agreements
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.. 369 U.S 95. 103 (1962) tquoting PcnnsN1%ama R R % Public
Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)): see also supra text accoinpan),mg note 189
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There is one final concern. To the extent that courts have something of a
blind spot on the issue of employer fraud, it is difficult to imagine precisely
how the common law would rectify such an infirmity. Workers should not, in
any event, expect the cure to come quickly. A statute passed by Congress and
signed by the President, however, seeking to guarantee workers the same right
to be free from fraud as enjoyed by capital investors could have an
extraordinary effect. By revealing the incongruity between the levels of
protection in the capital and labor markets, such a statute's direct effect would
be magnified by its educational effect on common law courts. To the extent
that the existing presumption against workers using common law fraud actions
is unintentional, a national statute might cause even state law courts to apply
the common law more generously and fairly.
V. EXPLORING A REGULATORY RESPONSE
That the common law does not now provide an adequate remedy against
fraud for workers and is unlikely to provide one in the near future does not in
itself provide a justification for statutory protection. Perhaps the costs of
antifraud regulation in the labor market are particularly high or the benefits
abnormally low. If either is true, the case for statutory antifraud protection
would be weakened. This part begins by examining more carefully the costs
and benefits of such statutory protection. The analysis shows that the net
benefits of fraud regulation are likely to be at least as high in the labor market
as in the capital market. This part then asks whether the necessary statutory
protection has been or could be implemented at the state level. It concludes
that states generally have not enacted strong antifraud regulation for the labor
market and are unlikely to do so. Moreover, a regime of state statutory
protection would impose uncertainty costs that would make it second best to
a federal regime. Having justified a statutory response on cost-benefit grounds
and having explained why a state regime is not likely or optimal, the final
section of the part sketches the contours of a possible federal statute protecting
the labor market from fraud.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Antifraud Regulation in the Labor Market
1. The Costs
To be sure, a statutory requirement of truthfulness imposes costs on the
speaker and, because of enforcement and monitoring costs, on society as a
whole.279 The relevant question here, however, is whether such a requirement
would have relatively higher costs, compared to benefits, when applied in the
279. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 54, at 733-34 nn.3 1-34 (discussing the social costs of truth-telling).
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labor market than when applied in the securities market. A precise analysis is
difficult without more empirical data, but there appears to be little reason to
believe that the costs of statutory fraud protection would be significantly
greater in the labor market than in the securities context.
One might contend that the enforcement and adjudication costs of fraud
protection in the labor market would be exorbitant because the meaning of
"materiality" would be extremely difficult for courts to define. The application
of the legal rule would thus be impossible for employers to anticipate. And
because employers communicate to employees constantly, and in countless
ways, any looseness in the legal definition would force employers to bear
exorbitant costs to ensure that they do not run afoul of the law. Alternatively,
employers would simply stop communicating altogether to employees because
of the risks of legal liability.
This is a powerful objection, but it provides an unsuccessful distinction
between the labor market and the securities market. Companies engage in a
wide range of communications to employees, but most of this communication
does not pertain to the terms or conditions of employment. The
communications that arguably could contain misrepresentations actionable
under a law prohibiting fraud on employees would be some subset of all
employee communication. It is hardly clear, then, that the absolute amount of
communications at issue in the labor context would be greater than in the
securities context; after all, companies communicate constantly to the public
and to actual and potential investors. Even though the number of
communications at issue in the securities market is quite large, the concept of
materiality is still left to case-by-case analysis;2 '8 thus, the concept is quite
difficult to pin down ex ante. The costs of uncertainty, therefore, would be no
greater in the labor market.28'
In fact, there is reason to believe that monitoring costs would be lower in
the labor market. In the securities market, a fact is material if there is "'a
substantial likelihood" that a reasonable investor would consider it important
in deciding whether to purchase or sell a security.' 2 In Basic Inc. v.
Levinson,283 the Supreme Court essentially reduced this test to one that asks
whether the market price of the security was affected by the alleged
misstatement.2 4 Because of the efficiency and fluidity of the securities
280. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224. 250 (1988) ("Matenalit) depends on the facts and thus
is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.").
281. Moreover, in the absence of a federal statute, the common law of fraud still applies As noted
above, see supra text accompanying notes 182-184, the common la, impos-es large costs because of the
variation of legal rules across jurisdictions and the elasticity and uncertaint) of the legal rules within each
jurisdiction. A federal statute would minimize interjunsdictional differences and would decrease uncertaint)
costs.
282. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.. 426 U.S. 438. 449 (1976)
283. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
284. In recognizing the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Court allowed plaintiffs sho traded in reliance
on the market price to establish a presumption that they relied on the alleged misstatement e'en if they
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market, one would expect that prices would be very sensitive to company
communications. Thus, the threshold for materiality would be quite low, and
the costs of monitoring the range of communications that might include
material statements quite high. If the definition of materiality in the labor
market is analogous to that in the securities market, courts would seek to learn
whether an employer's statement would tend to affect the market wage of the
jobs it provided. Because the labor market is much less efficient and fluid than
the securities market,285 one would expect that wages would be less
susceptible to putative misstatements than would securities prices. The
threshold for materiality would thus be higher in the labor market. That is,
even if a little misstatement might affect the market price of a company's
security, wages would be affected only by a somewhat larger lie. In this way,
then, the labor market's inefficiency would actually make an antifraud statute
less costly to administer.286 One could thus expect lower monitoring costs in
the labor market than those already borne in the securities market.
Another cost of statutory antifraud protection in the labor market would
be the potential for frivolous litigation brought by disgruntled workers. 27 But
it is doubtful that frivolous litigation would be as great a problem under a
labor fraud statute as it is under the securities acts, for at least two reasons.
First, as explained in Part 1,288 antifraud protection in the capital market goes
quite far beyond the "core" case to include fraud that affects the secondary
market as well fraud through insider trading. Because the fraud of concern in
the labor market is only "primary market" fraud-deceit by employers on
employees-there would be fewer possible bases for frivolous suits than in the
securities markets. Second, because the scope of the fraud will tend to be less
national in the labor market and because the wage system is less fluid than the
price system in the capital market,289 the damages awarded under labor law
suits will tend to be less than under the securities acts. It is less likely, then,
that lawsuits under the labor fraud statute will be instigated by an overly
zealous plaintiff's bar motivated by a desire for quick, lucrative
settlements.29
never actually heard or read the misstatement. See id. at 245-47. This holding can be correct only if one
assumes that changes in prices cause changes in investors' decisions.
285. See supra Section II.C.
286. As noted above, see supra Section II.C, the labor market's inefficiency in some ways makes the
fraud that occurs more costly. Once again, a difference between the securities and labor markets cuts in
favor of protection in the latter.
287. Cf Romano, supra note 78, at 69-70 (discussing causes of the increased numbers of employee
suits against corporate directors, including those filed by employers).
288. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Section II.C.
290. Cf Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2054 (1995)
("Controversy abounds about securities class actions, centering on the fact that attorneys operating on a




Finally, one might worry that antifraud protection in the labor market will
increase the cost of labor. This increased cost will make it more likely that
companies will locate, or relocate, their facilities to countries where workers
are not so protected. The response to such an argument also finds an analogy
in the capital market. Indeed, strong antifraud rules make it more difficult for
deceitful companies to gain access to capital in U.S. markets. This may have
forced some companies to seek capital in other equity markets around the
world. But their departure is not a subject of consternation. Instead, the
departure of deceitful companies to other capital markets is applauded as it
makes it cheaper for honest companies to gain the capital they need here in the
United States. Only if one doubts that fraud is a drag on the economy can one
moum the exodus of fraudulent companies.
The same argument holds in the labor market. Over the long term, the
presence of fraud in the labor market actually tends to make labor more-not
less-expensive because workers must be compensated for being subject to
deceit. If this economic story has some basis in reality, one should expect to
see a decrease in labor costs after the passage of a strong antifraud law for the
labor market. To the extent that labor costs for deceitful companies would
increase, they should be more than offset by cost reductions for honest
companies.
2. The Benefits
On balance, then, the relative costs of a labor antifraud statute would
appear to be no higher, and possibly lower, than the analogous costs of
enforcing fraud protection in the capital markets. But the key comparison, of
course, should be between the costs of fraud protection and its benefits. A
description of the benefits of a regulation of fraud in the labor market relative
to the capital market would have to begin with a reminder that the costs of
inaccurate information are plausibly much greater in the labor market. As
discussed above,29' a worker's inability to find substitute jobs easily or to
diversify her risks will make fraud more costly than if substitutes were readily
available and her risks were diversified, as is the case with the typical capital
investor.
A related point should be made here. The lack of diversification may make
fraud more likely in the labor market than in the capital market. Workers are
often more valuable to employers when they develop firm-specific skills (thus
reducing the possibility of limiting risk through diversification). But employees
need to be induced to develop such skills. Without such inducement,
employees will be unwilling to dedicate resources to develop skills that cannot
be transferred elsewhere and that therefore do not improve their ability to
291. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
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command an increased wage in the market. Moreover, rational employees
realize that once they develop firm-specific skills, they are at risk of
opportunistic behavior by firms. Firms can threaten workers with termination
if they do not accept reductions in their compensation. To encourage firm-
specific investment by their employees, employers will seek to assuage
workers' concerns by making commitments about job security. 92
This helps to explain why strong incentives exist for misrepresentation in
the labor market. It may be expensive to back up the representations of job
security; employment contracts that are not terminable at will are more costly.
But without strong antifraud laws in the labor market, employers will be able
to represent that they provide employment contracts not terminable at will
when in fact they provide just that. Employees will thus develop firm-specific
skills, giving the employers the advantage of their increased value to the firm
while the employees will still be subject to opportunistic behavior by
employers. The more specifically skilled the employees become, the more they
will ask for some assurances from their employers, and the more likely their
employers will resort to fraud.
Of course, workers would eventually learn that they could not depend on
their employers' representations. Employers who could in fact offer job
security would have to bond their representations or offer some other way for
workers to verify them. But these devices will impose costs of their own, costs
that an antifraud rule would help avoid. Moreover, as noted above,293 these
devices will be imperfect. And to the extent they are imperfect, workers will
begin to doubt the entire labor market just as investors would begin to doubt
the capital market. Over time, a labor market without fraud protection will tend
to be dragged down toward the level of the firms providing insecure
employment because secure employers will bear disproportionate costs. As
secure employers suffer disproportionately, the jobs they offer will become
relatively less secure. Perhaps we live in such a world now. A rule against
fraud will provide the additional, important benefit of avoiding (or rectifying)
this harmful effect. Put another way, a rule against fraud would allow secure
employment firms that otherwise could not survive to establish a niche in the
labor market.294
While it should be clear that these benefits provide a strong argument for
an antifraud rule in the labor market,295 it is less obvious whether these
292. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 1074-75 (discussing the willingness of firms to make job security
commitments).
293. See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text.
294. It would be interesting to test this, hypothesis empirically. One would expect, holding other things
equal, that in jurisdictions with strong antifraud protection, employers would tend to offer more secure
employment than in those jurisdictions with weak protection.
295. It seems likely that the benefits would outweigh the costs. Wages and salaries for all
nongovernmental employees in the United States during 1995 (the most current data available) totaled just
under $2.8 trillion, and compensation of employees not included in wages and salaries totaled another $790
(Vol. 107: 715
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benefits would be relatively greater in the labor market than in the securities
market. It is worth noticing, however, that the capital market provides
significant incentives for private monitoring of fraud while the labor market
is much more dependent on government protection. For example, large
institutional investors, which own over one half of equity holdings in the
United States, 96 have both incentives and resources to monitor companies
in which they invest. Moreover, because capital is so fluid, arbitrageurs can
make money in the market by discovering frauds that falsely inflate the value
of securities and selling those securities short 91 In addition, investment
advisors can make money by selling information about suspected frauds to
investors.298
On the other hand, none of these private monitoring devices exists to any
meaningful extent in the labor market. Because labor is much less fluid than
capital, arbitrageurs and advisors cannot make their fortunes by uncovering
employer misstatements. Unions do have some incentives to detect employer
fraud. But unions are relatively weak in the United States compared to other
billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ThiE UNITED STATES-1996. at 449
(1996). If we make the reasonable assumption that the absence of fraud protection has increased labor costs
by one percent, a fraud rule would thus create a savings in the range of S36 billion dollars per year Even
if monitoring and enforcement costs are quite high. it is difficult to imagine that they would swamp this
figure. Cf. Stout, supra note 84, at 713-14 (making a similar calculation for the securities market).
296. See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving
Structure of Federal Securities Regulation. 93 MIeti. L. REv. 649.657 (1995). Seligman cites data showing
that, as of the end of the first quarter of 1992, institutions held 54.2% of the $4.96 tillion market value
of outstanding stock. See id. at 658 n.47 (citing Institutions Hold Doninant Stake in Equities Market. Fed
Board Data Show, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 943 (July 9. 1993)).
297. Cf. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95"nt CONG,. REPORT OF TIlE
ADVISORY CoMMI-reE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO TIlE SECURmES AND ExCiIANGE COMMISSION 620-
21 (Comm. Print 1977) ("[Competition among analysts results in security pnces that reflect a broad set
of information."); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman. The Mechanisns of Market Efficencv. 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 571 (1984) ("In today's securities markets, the dominant minority of informed traders is the
community of market professionals, such as arbitrageurs, researchers. brokers and portfolio managers. who
devote their careers to acquiring information and honing evaluative skills.")
298. In the capital market, there also exists "'a uniquely active and responsive financial press which
facilitates the broad dissemination of highly timely and material company-oriented information to a vast
readership." Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities
Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Dock. 1175. 1179 (Sept. 16. 1980). Moreover. the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange. and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) require their member companies to disclose promptly all developments material to investors and
to correct market rumors. See BROWN. supra note 54. § 3,02. See generally id- § 3 06 (describing self-
regulatory organizations in the security markets). For example, the NYSE expects its listed companies "to
release quickly to the public any news or information which might reasonably be expected to materially
affect the market for its securities." NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 'I 202.05
(1996). To be sure, these self-regulatory organizations do not have the legal power to impose civil or
criminal penalties. But violations of these rules can result in significant sanctions, including the suspension
of trading, the delisting of a company, or, in the case of the NASD. a denial of access to the automated
quotation system important for over-the-counter securities trading. See BROWN. supra note 54. § 3 06[51.
The oversight of these organizations, which have no analogy in the labor market, provides a significant
brake on the incentive to mislead investors. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence
and Interest Group Formation: A Case StudY of the SEC at Stxt).. 15 CARDOzO L. REV 909. 934-35 (1994)
(arguing that the self-regulation of the various security exchanges provides significant protection for
investors). It may not be correct to view these institutions as totally private monitoring devices, however.
because it is unclear that they would exist absent the threat of regulation
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industrial nations, 99 and their strength is in a historical period of decline.
Fewer than one out of every five workers in the United States is now
represented by a union."' In no way can unions provide the powerful private
monitoring in the labor market that large institutional investors provide in the
capital market. Without effective private monitoring devices, the labor market
stands to benefit significantly from statutory protection from fraud. It is
reasonable to believe, in fact, that the net benefits would be greater in the labor
market than in the capital market. And to the extent union strength is in a
period of historical decline, legal protection is becoming even more important
because employees have few self-help options.
The argument could be made, however, that monitoring institutions are
unnecessary in the labor market. Employees might be able to investigate past
corporate behavior fairly easily. When a prospective employee is considering
two jobs, she can glean reputational information from numerous sources. When
she is weighing whether to believe her employer vis-?-vis some representation
to her, she is able to evaluate the likely truthfulness of the statement based on
previous statements made by the company. Especially with regard to employer
representations concerning the health of a specific factory, workers often have
a very acute sense of how the plant is doing: They can monitor the level of
inventories or whether management continues to invest in maintenance, for
example. This is something that an investor cannot do very easily. One might
say that the labor market is much more personal than the capital market and
thus that a worker is better able to judge the credibility of any representation
made.
But another, more plausible story can be told. For many workers, it is
quite difficult to gather material information about working conditions, job
security, and the like.30' And it is even more difficult for workers-whether
they are presently working for the firm or are prospective employees-to
gather the kind of information necessary to evaluate statements like those made
in Youngstown. Whom would they ask? What would they ask? Indeed, with
many kinds of jobs, and with many kinds of workers, getting sufficient
information to evaluate whether one's employer (or prospective employer) is
lying is either impossible or exorbitantly costly. Moreover, in those cases in
which the employer in fact is lying, the employer must believe that the deceit
299. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, WORLD LABOR REPORT 1993, at 34 tbl.3.l (1993) (showing
union density in the United States at 15% in 1989 compared to, for example, 32% in Germany, 39% in the
United Kingdom, 45% in Australia, and 81% in Sweden).
300. See id.; see also Stone, supra note 95, at 578 (stating that, between 1980 and 1990, union
membership declined from almost 25% of the nonagricultural work force to less than 17%).
301. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 74 (1990) ("[Tlhe worker who is shopping
for a job will find it very difficult to learn (and certainly will not want to ask) about the actual dismissal
risks in the firms being interviewed."); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause
and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 27 (1993) ("Young job entrants cannot easily assess an
employer's reputation for how it handles senior workers.").
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has a desirable effect, otherwise it would not risk the reputational
consequences of being discovered. 2
On the other hand, even though they may not have access to the plant
floor, investors and their agents often have access to the company's
decisionmakers in ways that workers do not. And without unions to play the
role of a monitor, a company can lie to its employees in Ohio and suffer little
reputational consequences among its workforce in California. In the capital
market, the reputational injury of fraud speeds through phone lines and
computer networks almost instantaneously. Thus the reputational costs firms
suffer when they defraud investors are likely to be larger, and suffered over a
broader geographical area, than the reputational costs from lying to workers.
B. The Possibiliti
, 
of State, Rather than Federal, Regulation
It is likely, therefore, that antifraud regulation for workers will be at least
as cost-effective as existing regulation in the capital markets. Still, it is worth
asking whether the regulatory response has already occurred or could occur at
the state level. If state statutes could already guarantee accurate information,
the affirmative case for a federal statute would be weakened. In addition, one
might suggest that leaving the regulation of employer fraud to the states has
affirmative benefits over and above what a national standard could offer.
Federalism allows states to use their laws to compete for businesses and
workers. The states that have the most efficient mix of legal rights and duties
will attract the right mix of businesses and workers. If a state's law is too
protective of workers, companies will locate elsewhere. If a state's law is too
protective of businesses, workers will relocate. This argument would suggest
that rules produced by this interplay are more likely to be efficient than rules
promulgated by a nationwide regulatory regime. 03
The difficulty with this argument is that it does not seem to correlate with
what one discovers when investigating various states' regulatory responses
toward fraud in the workplace. As shown above,0 it is unlikely that the
most efficient legal rule is to have no, or little, regulation of fraud in the labor
market. Yet that is exactly what one finds at the state level. Few states offer
any statutory protection against fraud in the workplace.0 Indeed, the
302. Moreover, the law already has a method to deal with those eases in which the employee in fact
does have information that causes them to doubt the employer's representation If the employee knows the
employer is lying, reliance on those lies is unreasonable and recovery is barred See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
303. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54. at 691; Macey. supra note 298. at 935-36; Romano.
supra note 85 (manuscript at 6-7).
304. See supra Parts II & I1.
305. Indeed, courts in Connecticut, Georgia. Massachusetts. Minnesota. and North Carolina have held
that disputes arising out of the employer-employee relationship are not cosered by those states' unfair trade
practices statutes. See DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND TIlE LAw § 4 021511f (1996) (collecting
cases). California is an exception. See id.
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absence of fraud protection for workers is made stark when one considers the
wide range of protection states offer in other areas of commerce.3°
Why, given the well-known theory of competition among various states
producing efficient sets of state laws, do we find most states without
efficiency-promoting fraud protection? One possibility is that the states are
competing to their collective detriment. Markets have defects, and to the extent
states compete in what amounts to a market to produce laws, they may face
defects akin to those suffered in other kinds of markets. Collective action
problems are among the most familiar of market failures: Individually rational
behavior may produce collective irrationality, and if everyone acts in her self-
interest, serious harm will frequently result.0 7 In the context of state
regulation, it is likely most efficient for all jurisdictions to have statutory rules
against employer fraud, but each individual jurisdiction is unlikely to be
willing to be the first to adopt such a rule. Each jurisdiction will need
assurances that the others will go along. Without such guarantees, state
legislators and regulators will worry that strong workplace antifraud rules in
their jurisdiction will increase the costs to companies of doing business in the
state, causing employers to relocate elsewhere. 30 8 This worry is based on a
simplistic view of the economics of fraud protection. 309 Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that individual state legislators will willingly bear the political risk of
taking the lead on antifraud protection for the labor market.3t Regulation at
the federal level can resolve this collective action difficulty among the states.
Viewed this way, a federal law does not usurp state power. Instead, it is the
method through which states fulfill their collective desire to protect the labor
market from the inefficiencies of fraud. Without federal intervention, the states
are left in a situation that none of them would prefer.
306. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1997) ("Unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful."). Chapter 93A has been interpreted to exclude disputes arising from the employer-employce
relationship. See Manning v. Zuckerman, 444 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Mass. 1983).
307. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RtHTS REVOLTrION 49 (1990).
308. To be sure, workers will be willing to relocate to such a jurisdiction because of the added
protection the state offers. In times of labor surplus, however, there would be little benefit from such an
effect. In fact, additional workers in the labor force, linked with fewer jobs, will increase unemployment
and decrease wages.
309. See supra Part I1.
310. This "race to the bottom" analysis parallels the analysis sometimes offered as an explanation for
the trend in corporate law toward more permissive state incorporation statutes. In the corporate context, the
literature is extensive and somewhat contentious. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at
212-15 (describing the debate over whether a race to the bottom exists); MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960, at 84 (1992) (describing competition among states on
the basis of allowances for corporate consolidations); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that competition among states occurs on the
basis of which state best allows managers to exploit investors); Roberta Romano, The State Competition
Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 709 (1987) (claiming that Delaware is the preferred state
of incorporation because of its body of legal precedents and sophisticated corporate bar); Ralph K. Winter,
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977)
(arguing that competition among states is driven by investor interests).
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This is not to say that a state should not, or could not, have strong
antifraud protection for workers. The collective action problem suggested
above is almost certainly more of a political problem than an economic one.
A state enacting a fraud statute for the labor market may be able to generate
a comparative advantage vis-a-vis other states in competing for firms that
provide (for example) secure employment. Because the absence of fraud
protection imposes relatively greater costs on firms providing secure
employment, 3" such firms will prefer to locate in jurisdictions that penalize
fraud. Unfortunately, states do not appear to have chosen to compete on such
a basis. Perhaps legislators are unconvinced by the economic arguments or
worry that the short-term harmful effects of insecure employers leaving the
state will swamp the positive effects of secure employers entering the state.
Perhaps state legislatures simply have not considered the issue or have been
captured by those who would be hurt by an antifraud statute for the labor
market.
Even in the best-case scenario, however, a web of state statutes would take
second place to a federal statute. As the common law imposes costs because
of the variability and uncertainty of legal rules across jurisdictions,' 2 a
regime of state statutes would suffer from the same defects. A national statute
is much more likely to provide uniformity and certainty, lessening the
aggregate costs of enforcement and compliance.
C. The Contours of a Proposed Model Statute
If the arguments thus far are convincing, it would be useful to think about
what a statute protecting against fraud in the labor market might look like.
Consider the following, based on Rule lOb-5:
It shall be unlawful for any employer engaged in interstate commerce,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business that
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the offering or provision of employment, the
negotiation of the terms of an employment relation, or the offering or
continuing provision of employment benefits."31
311. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text
312. See supra text accompanying notes 182-184
313. Cf. supra note 49 (repnnting Rule lOb-5)
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This statute would make actionable employer misrepresentations and
material omissions in connection with those things that workers consider
important in deciding between jobs: job security, employee benefits, and the
terms and conditions of the employment relationship. It would have offered the
possibility of a federal remedy to the steel workers in Youngstown and West
Virginia.'1
4
Though based on Rule lOb-5, it is worth noting that this statute would be
narrower than lOb-5 in an important respect. Under lOb-5, a corporation and
its insiders are under an affirmative duty to disclose inside information
whenever they wish to trade in the securities market. If this requirement were
to be transferred to the labor and employment context, the company would be
under a virtually constant duty to disclose material information to its
employees because the company, in an important sense, is trading in the labor
market every time it hires or fires an employee or negotiates the terms of an
employment contract.
This aspect of lOb-5 law would not transfer automatically to the labor
context because, according to the Supreme Court, the underlying rationale for
the duty to disclose or abstain under lOb-5 is the existence of a fiduciary duty
between the insider or corporation and the other transacting party." 5 In the
labor context, however, courts do not generally recognize a fiduciary duty
running from the employer to the employee. t6 Therefore, it seems unlikely
314. Note also that the statute as proposed focuses only on employer fraud. This can be justified on
a number of grounds. As discussed above, see supra note 142, the costs of employer deceit of employees
is likely to be greater than the reverse because employers can easily diversify their risk of employee deceit
and can substitute honest employees for deceitful ones at lower cost. In addition, the scale of the harm to
the efficiency of the labor market is likely to be greater when an employer deceives employees than when
an employee deceives her employer. That is, an employer's misrepresentations will tend to affect a number
of workers, and thus the labor market as a whole, while an individual worker's deceit is unlikely to have
significant impact beyond her own employment relationship. In addition, employers would not face the
preemption problems that workers are likely to face because any employee fraud is unlikely to concern
collective bargaining agreements or ERISA plans.
Finally, the focus on employer, rather than employee, deceit finds an analogy in the securities laws.
As discussed above, see supra Subsection I.B.1, a number of antifraud provisions of the securities laws
focus only on the "issuer" or "seller" of securities: Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act applies to "any person
who ... offers or sells a security"; section I I(a) of the 1933 Act focuses on "issuers" of securities; and
section 17(a) concentrates on fraud by "any person in the offer or sale of any security," which has always
been interpreted to mean sellers. See also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 743 (discussing sections
9(a)(4) and 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4), j(b) (1994), which also focus on the issuer). The
core idea that market participants should not lie in a market transaction in order to take value from others
was thus first, and most firmly, applied against those who sought fraudulently to induce others to invest
their resources in a venture, i.e., when the justifications for antifraud protection are at their highest. See
supra note 32 and accompanying text. The analogy in the labor market is to employer fraud. When a
company uses fraud to induce workers to invest their resources-that is, their labor-in a venture, the
justifications for antifraud protection in the labor market are similarly at their highest.
315. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. In the misappropriation context, the obligation to
disclose or abstain from trading arises out of a fiduciary duty to the source of the inside information. See
supra note 65.
316. There are powerful arguments to the contrary. See O'Connor, supra note 26 (arguing that courts
should expand directors' fiduciary duties to require them to mitigate disruptions caused by corporate
changes); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Neorus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty To Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991) (same).
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that courts would transplant the duty to disclose or abstain into the labor law
context, even given a statute that closely aligns with Rule lOb-5. Thus the
duties required under the labor antifraud statute would likely be less than those
under Rule lOb-5, even though the operative language would be the same.
Without a disclose-or-abstain rule, employers would not have an affirmative
duty to disclose all material inside information anytime they engage in a
"trade" in the labor market.
Instead, courts interpreting the above statute would likely look for
analogous duties arising under the securities laws (and common law) in non-
insider trading contexts. Duties in these contexts depend not on a fiduciary
duty between the parties but on the need to protect the underlying market from
falsehoods and incomplete statements." 7 Thus, the duties of truthfulness and
completeness would likely arise whenever a company made statements, even
voluntarily, about matters that would be material to employees or potential
employees. Materiality would likely be defined analogously as well. As
materiality under Rule lOb-5 is determined by asking whether a piece of
information would be important to a reasonable shareholder in deciding
whether to buy or sell a security,"' materiality under the labor market fraud
statute could be determined by asking whether the piece of information would
be important to a reasonable person in deciding whether to enter into or
continue an employment relationship.
This statute, like Rule lOb-5, would also enforce a requirement of
completeness. 31 9 Factual accuracy-"We have no immediate plans to shut
down our facility"-will not insulate a company's communication from
possible liability if something is left out--"but we plan to shut down next
quarter"-that makes the statement materially misleading. Or, if a company
represented to an incoming employee that she would receive certain benefits,
it would be deemed actionable if the employer intentionally failed to state
conditions on such benefits and if the failure to state the conditions made the
representation misleading. Moreover, this statute would likely be construed
analogously to Rule lOb-5 as imposing a duty on employers to correct and
update past statements that have become materially misleading because of
changed circumstances.320 So construed, this statute would be a powerful
shield against inefficiencies and unfairness caused by fraud in the labor
market.32'
317. See supra note 67 and accompanying text
318. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway. Inc., 426 U S 438. 449 (1976)
319. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text
320. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text
321. The calculation of damages under such a statute would in somc circumstances entail much
complexity. In the securities context, however. several obscervm do not find the system to be as chaotic
as it initially appears. See. e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCIIEL supra note 51. at 315-16 For a further
discussion of damages in the securities context, see Mahoncy. supra note 52. at 627 & n 13 The details
of this issue, however, are beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting, in any event, that damages
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VI. CONCLUSION
Fraud is theft. In the context of the securities markets, this straightforward
proposition undergirds very strict statutory protection. When workers are
concerned, however, the proposition has not been taken nearly as far. In fact,
under existing doctrine, if company management lies to shareholders in order
to benefit employees (say, by understating employee benefits in an annual
report in order to avoid shareholder protests), management will have violated
federal law. If, on the other hand, management lies to workers in order to
benefit shareholders (say, by misleading employees about the security of their
jobs to keep them working diligently up until a plant closing), there is no
federal statute that would make such fraud actionable.
This Article has argued that there are no compelling justifications for such
a difference. First, the difference cannot be justified on economic grounds. The
labor market, like the capital market, depends on the free flow of information
to ensure allocational efficiency. Fraud regulation, in fact, may be more
important in the labor market because workers cannot easily minimize the risk
of fraud through diversification. Moreover, there are fewer incentives for
private monitoring to take the place of government regulation.
Second, the absence of statutory fraud protection in the labor market
cannot be explained by the availability of common law remedies. The common
law is insufficient because of the troublesome preemption problems posed by
section 301 of the LMRA and by ERISA. Section 301 preempts many claims
that relate to collective bargaining agreements, and ERISA bars many state law
fraud claims that relate to employee benefits. Moreover, when employee
claimants succeed in overcoming these procedural impediments, some courts
seem to apply what amounts to a presumption against using common law tort
to aid workers defrauded by their employers. This apparent presumption is
illustrated by the White case,322 in which the court seemed to hold the
employee plaintiffs to a higher standard than would be applied to other market
participants. Furthermore, even setting aside these obstacles, the common law
is less efficient than statutory protection and is unlikely to be an adequate
substitute for it in this context.
Finally, the absence of statutory fraud protection cannot be justified on the
basis of a cost-benefit analysis. While there certainly would be monitoring,
enforcement, and other costs associated with statutory protection, it is unlikely
that such costs would be greater than those already borne in the capital market.
in a common law fraud action can be either contract (benefit-of-the-bargain) damages or tort damages. See
RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTs § 549 (1977); LOSS, supra note 29, at 875-76, 965-75. The choice
between them depends on a number of factors. Depending on the case and facts at hand, courts could make
similar judgments under the labor market fraud statute.
322. White v. National Steel Corp., 938 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1991).
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The actual reasons that workers do not enjoy the same level of protection
as capital investors may have more to do with politics than with the details of
a cost-benefit analysis or the availability of common law remedies. But to the
extent justifications matter, it is important to note that workers in the United
States are exposed to the risk of employer misrepresentations about subjects
that are crucial to their lives and that they have little legal protection from such
risk. Such exposure imposes costs not only on the workers but also on society
as a whole.

